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ABSTRACT
Through a detailed analysis of Duhem’s writings some light is cast on the relations 
between holism, underdetermination and theory-ladenness of experimentation. The 
latter, which results from the need to interpret theoretically what is actually observed 
during an experiment, plays a key role in Duhem’s analysis of the relation between 
observation and theory. I will argue that the theory-ladenness of experimentation on one 
hand provides a general argument for the holistic character of theory testing, and on the 
other renders problematic the thesis that theories are underdetermined by empirical 
evidence. A tension is found between Duhem’s claim that the aim of theory is to save 
the phenomena and his analysis of the interpretative role of theory in experiments. I 
suggest how to overcome this difficulty by showing in what sense we can say that 
theory saves theory-laden phenomena.
After stressing the differences between the Duhemian and the Quinean variants of 
holism, I argue that Quine fails to take into account the importance of the theory- 
ladenness of experimentation and the implications of Duhem’s thought: Quine shares 
with the Logical Empiricists the belief that it is possible to detach from theories their 
empirical content. His acceptance of holism has simply the effect of restricting the 
attribution of empirical content only to conjunctions of many theoretical statements. I 
analyse and criticise the two notions of empirical content that Quine has developed. 
Furthermore I argue that there is no general theory-free expression of the experiential 
implications of a theory, for theories are logically connected to observable events only 
within local contexts defined theoretically and brought about by the activities of 
experimenters.
Finally I suggest that, in the light of these considerations, the implications resulting 
from the possibility of rival incommensurable traditions of research should be 
discussed, rather than Quine’s dilemma concerning empirically equivalent systems of 
the world.
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1. DUHEM’S ANALYSIS OF THEORY TESTING IN PHYSICS
Introduction
In this chapter I will expose and analyse in detail Duhem’s account of the relation 
between theory and observation in physics. For this purpose I introduce a terminology 
that will be adopted throughout the thesis. I also discuss some examples that will be 
often referred to in subsequent chapters when dealing with Quine’s philosophy of 
science.
The thesis that no hypothesis in physics can be tested in isolation (also referred to as 
the Duhem Thesis or the thesis of holism in theory testing) will be shown to be a 
consequence of the theory-ladenness of experimentation. Duhem illustrates the latter by 
underlining the contrast between common-sense observation and experiment: an 
experiment requires always a theoretical interpretation of what is directly perceived. I 
then analyse the consequences of Duhem’s analysis for the doctrine of 
underdetermination.1 The latter is not a logical consequence of holism, although 
Duhem’s discussion suggests examples of pragmatic underdetermination. The logical 
consequence of holism is rather the multiplicity of paths that a researcher can 
legitimately follow when confronted with a refuting experiment.
The theory-ladenness of experimentation renders the idea of underdetermination 
problematic, for the latter is meaningful insofar rival theories can be said to save the 
same phenomena. Indeed there is a tension in Duhem’s thought between his insistence 
that the aim of physical theory is simply to save the phenomena and his findings 
concerning the theory-ladenness of experimentation. In the last two sections I try to 
solve this tension suggesting that theory saves theory-laden phenomena and that
1 There are many formulations of the problem of underdetermination. Often is argued that two theories 
can be said to be underdetermined only if they are equally supported by the available evidence. Therefore 
the mere fact that two theories imply the same observable consequences would not be enough to consider 
them as underdetermined by empirical evidence. As it will soon be clear, this thesis will deal rather with a 
preliminary problem, that is with the nature of the veiy connection between theory and observation.
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therefore its function is twofold: to inform and to save the phenomena. This conclusion 
is reached by comparing the different relations subsisting between theory and 
observation respectively in ancient astronomy and in modern physics.
1.1 Common-sense facts and common-sense laws
In his most influential book, The Aim and Structure o f Physical Theory, Duhem draws 
a sharp distinction between two kinds of facts, common-sense on one side, interpreted 
or theoretical ones on the other. Generalisation and induction applied to these two 
kinds of facts lead to the formulation respectively of common-sense laws and scientific 
laws. The recognition of a common-sense fact is for Duhem absolutely uncontroversial 
insofar there is no ground to doubt of the normal conditions under which the 
observation has been carried out. An observational report such as "there is now a white 
horse in Portugal Street" is indeed vague insofar it does not describe the phenomenon 
in a detailed way, but ought to be believed without hesitation if supported by direct 
experience. From such uncontroversial facts we can infer what Duhem calls common- 
sense laws, i.e. generalisations that are true in virtue of pure observation and inductive 
inference. An example of such law could be "all men are mortal" or "the thunder is 
heard always after the flash of lightning has been seen". As Duhem is justly ranked 
among the critics of inductive methodology, is it worth noticing that he does not 
submit to any scrutiny the validity of these simple cases of inductive inferences. They 
lead to statements that are true "for all time and for all men" and their degree of 
certainty is "fixed and absolute" .
A statement such as "all men are mortal" is indeed abstract and general: it expresses 
the relation between the abstract idea of man and the abstract idea of death. It is 
actually the case that any law-like statement must include general terms. What is then 
the source of the certainty with which we can assert such established truth of common- 
sense? The answer lies in the fact that in a particular man we can see the embodiment 
of the abstract idea of man and similarly in the case of a particular death, or thunder of 
lightning. The abstract concept "man" is but an abstraction obtained considering what
2 ASPT, p. 178.
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there is in common to all particular men. If we wish to verify the truth of the law in 
question we can proceed to observe a particular case to which the abstract notions 
directly apply. Adopting the usual terminology brought later into fashion by the logical 
empiricists, we could say that Duhem is here considering “man” and “mortal” as 
observational terms that are unambiguously applicable. However, it will be always 
important to remember that Duhem does not distinguish explicitly and systematically 
between facts and the linguistic expressions used to state them.
Of course, the price that we pay in order to obtain the certainty of common-sense 
laws is the poverty and vagueness of the cognitive content of our statements. The 
sentence stating that every day the sun rises in Paris in the East and sets in the West is 
true and certainly so, but it informs us in no way on whether the point of the horizon at 
which the sun appears in the morning varies from day to day or from month to month; 
it does not tell us in what day of the year the shortest or the longest time separates the 
dawn from the sunset. The knowledge that we aspire to attain requires a precise 
account of the object of enquiry and, along with it, detailed indications of the 
conditions under which experience would confirm our account. In order to achieve 
these goals we must replace ordinary testimony with physical experiment and ordinary 
language with the language of physical theories. What is the difference then between 
the latter and the former? What is the nature of physical experiment? Let us first 
analyse the notion of fact and then let us move on to explain how from this notion we 
can formulate general laws.
1.2 The mismatch between common-sense facts and their interpretation in physical 
terms
Duhem deals with the problem for the first time in the section “Physical 
Approximation and Mathematical Precision”.3 A physical theory is here considered as 
a set of postulates in algebraic form from which it is possible to derive, with the aid of 
logical and mathematical deductive procedures, results that can be compared with 
observations carried out by means of physical experiments. Thermodynamics for
3 ASPT, p. 132.
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instance tells us that a certain block of ice under a certain pressure will melt at a 
precise value of the temperature. Let us here notice that in order to obtain a prediction 
of this kind the theory will have to include besides a number of principles, laws and 
theorems, also a classification of the materials and an indication of their relevant 
coefficients (such as specific heat or density). The situation is essentially that of a 
normal exercise in a physics textbook: some initial conditions defining the state of a 
system are given and the theory is used in order to derive the value of some properties 
of the system under study at the initial or at a different instant. How can we relate this 
abstract calculation with what we would actually observe if we were to perform the 
experiment?
It is clear that the abstract pattern of geometrical shapes and mathematical 
properties that we have in mind has very different features from what we actually 
observe in the laboratory. If we imagine confronting step by step the realisation of the 
experiment in terms of concrete objects and instruments with the solution of the 
associated physical problem that we could write on the blackboard, in order to 
compare the results and hence to judge on the validity of the theory, we immediately 
notice that, both at the beginning and at the end of the experiment, the theoretical 
description can be “welded” to what is actually observed only through acts o f  
measurement. The mathematical schematic description and the description carried out 
by the experimenter in terms of observable facts are expressed in different languages 
and, as Duhem points out,
... the method of measurement is the dictionary that makes possible
the rendering of these two translations in either direction.4
A sort of translation occurs between what Duhem refers to as “theoretical facts” and 
“practical facts”, the former being the mathematical data and the geometrical 
idealisations dealt with in the abstract reasoning of the theoretician. For instance a 
solid body whose thermal properties are under investigation will be considered as 
having a precise geometrical shape and a well-defined value of the temperature at each 
of its points. For the purpose of the theoretical treatment the real object is replaced by
4 ASPT, p. 133.
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an idealised one, which has perfectly defined properties. The practical fact, on the 
other hand, will have no precise geometrical or mathematical property. The shape will 
be only approximately defined and it will be possible in general only to ascribe a 
defined value of the temperature to a small region of it, not of course to each of its 
points (whatever this might mean). Moreover the result of a measurement is never a 
precise real number, but an interval of real numbers depending on the precision of the 
instrument used. Hence, whereas the theoretician will consider any two different 
values of a physical magnitude as incompatible results, the experimenter will consider 
them as coincident if their difference is not detectable by the available instruments. As 
a consequence the same practical fact, being approximate, can be made to correspond 
with an infinity o f incompatible theoretical facts. We find here a first level of 
inadequacy of the translation between what is dealt with by the experimenter and what 
is theorised about.
In the fourth chapter of The Aim and Structure o f Physical Theory, Duhem analyses 
in greater detail the nature of physical experiment and the relation between theoretical 
facts and practical facts. I will have occasion to notice that there is some vagueness in 
his terminology, which may lead to confusion. This defect in the exposition however 
does not affect the conclusions of Duhem’s arguments on this point.
Duhem invites us to imagine a laboratory in which a certain experiment is 
being performed. What the direct observation will attest is the movement of some 
pieces of metal, mercury columns becoming level with some line, the arrow of some 
instrument moving and other ordinary facts. The experimenter on the other hand will 
record on her notebook that, say, a certain increase in temperature has produced a 
certain change in the resistance of a coil. Thus, we face here two distinct parts of the 
same experiment: on one side there is a number of plain observations of what is 
directly manifest to the senses, on the other hand we have the written report, which is 
expressed in a symbolic and abstract language and hence consists of an interpretation 
of the observable part. This language contains terms such as “temperature”, “pressure”, 
“electric current” which are in no way found instantiated in concrete objects of 
observation. We don’t observe a value of the temperature, we observe the level of 
mercury in a glass column. In order to relate the content of direct testimony with 
abstract concepts we need physical theory.
12
In every experiment the interpretative role played by physical theory is visible 
at various levels. To start with, a physical concept is a magnitude, hence its 
determination needs a measurement procedure, which in turn is dependent on a number 
of theoretical assumptions. Even the simplest kind of measurement, the determination 
of a length, needs the assumptions that the ruler being used has a constant length, and 
that its shape is regular enough. Moreover most of physical concepts can be related to 
numbers only by means of instruments whose functioning is interpreted in the light of 
a physical principle. A thermometer works under the assumption that mercury expands 
when heated, and that the increase in volume is proportional to the increase in 
temperature; a magnetic galvanometer yields a numerical value that we can consider as 
the measure of an electric current, only if we assume a good deal of electromagnetic 
theory. The very meaning of these abstract concepts is given by the theories admitted 
by current physics. Theory is needed in order to translate what is actually observed into 
an abstract and symbolic judgement:
Not one of the words serving to state the result of such an experiment 
directly represents a visible and tangible object; each of them has an 
abstract and symbolic meaning related to concrete realities only by 
long and complicated theoretical intermediaries.5
Mathematical properties cannot be read off from the sensible appearance of an object, 
as for instance hardness or colours. The decision to describe a phenomenon in 
mathematical terms requires the adoption of theoretical assumptions about the 
phenomenon and about its relations with other phenomena.6
5 ASPT, p. 148.
6 Let us by physical property mean here a definite value of a physical magnitude which is attributed to 
an object through an act of measurement. We are so used to considering such properties as inhering in a 
particular object that we tend to regard them as monadic properties or predicates. An object is red, 
round, hard and is 3 meter long. In the light of the previous analysis it is clear that this way of thinking 
is wrong. This mistaken attitude is also somehow reinforced by the fact that we normally read from 
components such as resistors or capacitors their physical characteristics printed on them. Let us consider 
first the simplest magnitude: length. It is certainly a monadic intrinsic property of an object its having 
length, but not its having a certain length. In a world in which that object were the only existing one, it 
would be non-sense to ask how long it is. A measurement needs a unit of measurement, hence it requires 
at least the existence of another object. The result is then a ratio between two lengths. Of course the 
number by itself does not tell us anything about the objects; real numbers do not inhere in things as 
properties do (though natural numbers might be said to inhere in sets of things). We would be then 
tempted to say that while a ratio cannot be true of an object, it can certainly be true of a pair of objects,
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The interpretation of an experiment depends on accepted theory also in another 
sense. All the objects involved in the experiment must be replaced in the reasoning of 
the physicists by idealised versions of them. An electric wire has normally many 
irregularities in shape and impurities in the material it is made of, but the experimenter 
will be able to take into account these details only up to a certain level and, in order to 
do so, he will have to rely on further theoretical knowledge. Hence we need theory for 
the calibration of an instrument, which yields a set of values and properties that will 
define the idealised model of it on which the abstract reasoning will be applied. The 
consideration of systematic errors in the analysis of the data is due to the impossibility 
of eliminating certain undesired physical effects that interfere with the correct course 
of the experiment; and the determination of the value of a systematic error can be a 
very complicated (i.e. theory-dependent) procedure. Further it requires the 
presupposition that some disturbing physical effect is at work. But how can we 
possibly be sure that we are taking into account (if only in an approximate way) all of 
the perturbations produced by the environment on our experimental setting? Of course 
there is no such a guarantee: after taking all possible precautions, after having 
considered all the known kinds of physical effects, we will have simply to assume that 
no other effect is at work while the experiment is carried out.7 In conclusion the 
interpretation of the observed facts requires three main stages:
1. The sentences in common-sense language describing the facts really observed must 
be replaced by abstract and symbolic judgements.
and conclude that to say that a certain thing is three times and a half longer than a certain other thing is 
to state a relation between them. In this sense we could say that a number inheres in the pairs object-unit 
of measurement. But we face a first problem when we realise that an act of measurement can yield only 
an approximate value, hence, what is really the case is that an infinite set of numbers contains the 
possible candidates. Hence, we have a relation among two objects and a set of real numbers. Moreover 
the relation holds only under the assumptions implied by the method of measurement. The conclusion is 
that any act of measurement leads to the formulation of a triadic relation that is true under certain 
theoretical presuppositions. Hence it presupposes always a conceptual background that goes beyond 
mathematics by itself. (On the fact that measures cannot be “read off’ from objects see also Cassirer in 
Kockelmans, 1968. Cassirer quotes Duhem at length.)
7 This assumption turns out very often to be wrong. An important example is provided by the discovery 
of the X-rays. Kuhn underlines that X-rays had been certainly produced in the course of many 
experiments, among them even routine ones, long before Rontgen’s discovery, and that their presence 
exerted an unnoticed influence on the results of some of those experiments. Consequently, following the 
identification of the X-rays, physicists had to reinterpret some of their experimental practices (see, 
Kuhn, 1962, pp. 57-59).
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2. The instruments used must be mentally substituted by idealisations endowed with 
physical properties known in an approximate way.
3. The actual spatio-temporal region in which the phenomenon under investigation 
occurs must be replaced in the mind of the experimenter by a physical system fully 
defined by all physical properties that, as far as we know, may turn out to affect in 
some way the result.
The third condition corresponds essentially to the ceteris paribus clauses of Lakatos 
and states, we could say, that from the theoretical description of a phenomenon the 
entire world is omitted, except for what our theories assert to be relevant, once a 
certain degree of approximation in the physical description has been set as a target. 
Some of the effects will be in general produced by distant objects (as in the case of 
gravitational fields), hence they should be included in the “reduced world” in which 
the experiment is mentally situated. However it will suffice to know the effect of the 
distant object in the region where the experiment takes place.
As Duhem points out, it would be a mistake to think that the abstract and symbolic 
language adopted by the experimenter is merely a technical language, which could be, 
so to speak, translated word by word into the language of facts, as in the case, for 
instance, of the sailor-men jargon. An experimenter can certainly translate into facts a 
statement such as “there is here a current of 3 Ampere”, but he can do it in an infinity 
of different ways. For instance any circuit with an appropriate generator, connected 
with any appropriate kind of measurement device will constitute a good practical 
realisation of the theoretical situation reported in the sentence. In each of these cases 
what a naive observer would see in the laboratory is a completely different thing. In 
each case what is actually observed would be a visible effect (such as the position of a 
pointer) which is connected through a chain of events to the presence of the current, 
and the chain of events itself is not observed, but postulated by a theory. It is because 
we accept a certain description of the effects produced by electric currents on magnets, 
that we can interpret the movement of the pointer in a magnetic galvanometer as the 
clear sign that the current is on. Moreover no single observable event enables by itself 
the experimenter to draw a definite conclusion. It may happen that the pointer of the
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galvanometer stands still, while there are sparks in some breaks in the conductor or it 
may happen that a resistor is becoming warm. We would then say that there is 
something wrong with the galvanometer and that the current is indeed on. Hence the 
(so to speak) factual correspondent of statements such as “there is here a current of 3 
Ampere” or “the current is on” is an infinite set of different observable situations, 
which in virtue of the accepted theories (“in virtue of constant relations among diverse 
experimental laws”8) are assumed to reveal the presence of the current and are 
basically identified from the theoretical point o f view.
The disparity between the practical fact really observed, and the 
theoretical fact, the symbolic, abstract formula stated by the physicist, 
is revealed to us when very different concrete facts interpreted by a 
theory fuse into one another to constitute but one and the same 
experiment, and are expressed by a single symbolic proposition: the 
same theoretical fact may correspond to an infinity of distinct practical 
facts.9
If we remember our earlier result about the mismatch between practical facts and 
theoretical facts drawn from the necessarily approximate character of any 
measurement, we can conclude with Duhem:
A single theoretical fact may be translated into an infinity of disparate 
practical fact; a single practical fact corresponds to an infinity of 
incompatible theoretical facts.10
What does Duhem means here for practical factl As I anticipated before Duhem does 
not give to this expression a very clear meaning. A practical fact is what would be 
observed during an experiment by a person without any knowledge of physics.11 
Hence its description could for instance include the fact that a pointer is in a certain 
position, not the reading of the pointer expressed in number and unit of measurement.
8 ASPT, p. 151.
9 ASPT, p. 151-152.
10 ASPT, p. 152.
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The naive observer could at best say that the pointer is in the position labelled by a 
certain symbol, but he would not be able to say that this means, for instance, that the 
pressure of a gas has a certain value. As we have already noticed, any judgement 
concerning physical magnitudes is meaningful only against a background of physical 
theory.12 On the other hand, Duhem seems to refer to a practical fact as what the 
experimenter would report in her notebook,13 for instance “under such and such 
conditions the pressure of the gas is 125,2 Pascal, with an uncertainty of 0.1 Pascal” 
or, in general, as the rough mathematical description of a phenomenon that 
experimental practices allow to attain. This fact can be translated in an in fin ity  of 
incompatible theoretical facts (every value of pressure between 125.1 and 125.3 
Pascal). However, it has to be noticed that in the latter case we have an abstract and 
symbolic judgement, even though approximate, which may be further refined on the 
ground of the so-called “analysis or errors”. Hence the big interpretative step has been 
taken exactly in order to pass from the first to the second kind of “practical fact”. 
Physical theory is what is needed to interpret a “recital of concrete and obvious facts” 
as an experiment yielding a result in mathematical terms. The second stage is to take 
into account all the possible sources of systematic errors, hence obtaining a result with 
a better approximation. This procedure draws heavily on physical theory, but, it must 
be stressed, it is applied to data already formulated in the language of physics. The 
final result obtained in this way is thereafter compared with the prediction of the 
theory. Only at this level does it become relevant the fact that mathematical physics 
considers different and incompatible two values that the “coarse” experimenter will 
identify.
It is certainly better to refer to these two kinds of facts with different terms: I will 
call a fact as observed by the layman a brute fact while I will refer to the fact reported 
by the experimenter as a practical fa c t lA A practical fact can be more or less analysed 
and sophisticated according to the details of data-elaboration, but it will be always
11 ASPT, p. 151.
12 It is reasonable to assume that a layman is capable of counting and we may also allow him the ability 
to observe that the metal bar of a tangent galvanometer has deviated from its position roughly by a 
certain angle. However, none of his reports could ever make reference to physical units of measurement, 
which all imply commitment to physical theories.
13 ASPT, p. 134.
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formulated in approximate terms. It will therefore be sharply separated from the 
corresponding theoretical facts, which will be described in terms of pure idealisations 
and definite mathematical values and will be infinite in number.
Going back to the first example suggested by Duhem, let us imagine to be studying 
the thermal properties of a rigid body. The brute fact will be constituted by the 
experiences of hardness, shape and warmth and other ordinary denotations; the 
practical fact will consist of approximate descriptions in physico-mathematical terms; 
finally, the theoretical fact will be one of the many exact physico-mathematical 
descriptions compatible with the approximate one. According to this interpretation, the 
second quotation at page 15 should be read as referring to the relation between 
theoretical facts and brute facts.
One could suggest that physical measurement is needed to weld the brute fact 
with the practical facts, not, certainly, the latter with theoretical facts. But here again 
we face a problem. In the simple situation just described, the brute facts can be thought 
of as pre-existing the use of measurement instruments: we may imagine having the 
rigid body situated on a table and deciding that what we “see” at the moment 
constitutes the brute fact. We then add a thermometer and we proceed in the act of 
translating the brute fact into a set of approximate mathematical data. In this case such 
reconstruction is plausible, however it does not correspond to Duhem’s intent. The 
analysis he develops in chapter IV clearly aims at including in the brute facts the 
measurement instruments as mere objects and the aspects of their workings accessible 
to the senses. Hence, even the act of measurement has a purely phenomenal aspect, 
which subsequently is interpreted in the light of theoretical knowledge. In this picture 
it is the interpretative moment that welds what is actually observed with the world of 
abstractions and symbols. This descriptive approach is justified by the fact that in a 
physical experiment of a certain complexity it may well be very hard to isolate within 
the experimental setting what the phenomenon under investigation is by itself, from 
what is added in order to measure some of its inherent physical magnitudes. Moreover 
in this way Duhem makes clear that a measuring device is not a sort of magic camera
14 The ambiguity of Duhem’s terminology has lead, for instance, Maiy Hesse to identify without 
remainder the practical facts with the raw data of the experimenter, (see Hesse in Harding, 1976, p. 
186).
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which takes “mathematical pictures” of what we observe with the eyes; rather it is 
something causally related to the object of inquiry, in virtue of known empirical laws.
1.2.1 First Consequences
Let us quote Duhem’s conclusion and then try to analyse its implications:15
Between the phenomena really observed in the course of an 
experiment and the result formulated by the physicist, there is 
interpolated a very complex intellectual elaboration which substitutes 
for the recital of concrete facts an abstract and symbolic judgement.16
In this quotation we find the roots of Duhem’s holistic thesis about theory testing. 
Duhem contrasts the status of purely observational sciences, such as anatomy, whose 
relation with experience is very much analogous to the one of common-sense 
knowledge, with the peculiar status of physics. The fact that to the theoretical fact 
“there is current of 3 Ampere” there corresponds an infinity of concrete realisations 
has the following major consequences:
1. The meaning of physical terms or judgements cannot be specified with any 
ostensive procedure; no single class of observable facts by itself can ever embody the 
idea of, say, electric current.
2. The abstract and symbolic judgements of physics can be linked to a direct 
observation only relying on theoretical presuppositions. No single immediate 
observation (such as: “the pointer of the manometer is in division b”) has any import 
outside a network of assumptions (trivially, the manometer may be out of order, or 
there may be a distorting effect in the laboratory because of which the manometer does 
not read the value o f the pressure.)
15 Not all of the following implications are explicitly stated by Duhem in the same form (this is true 
most of all of consequence number four). I believe they can be seen as deriving from Duhem’s analysis.
16 ASPT, p. 153.
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3. Hence such judgements can be true only under the condition that there is no 
mistake in our presuppositions or in the way they have been related to the particular 
experimental situation. Their truth its, by definition, conditioned (or relative), in the 
sense that it does not result directly from a confrontation with given facts, being 
dependent upon the truth of other beliefs. Those beliefs, in turn, are themselves related 
to experience only indirectly.
4. If we believe that the source of meaning (if there is one) of an abstract and 
symbolic judgement is to be found in the concrete situation in which we could declare 
it true, we face the problem that the infinite set of such situations, we might well say, 
the equivalence class of empirical situations that is conceptually grouped by the 
judgement, is defined by physical theory itself.
On the other hand, that a practical fact can be translated into an infinity of theoretical 
facts, implies, in conjunction with what has already been established, that:
1. The abstract and symbolic judgements of physics are always approximate.
2. Although it is in principle always possible to narrow down the “indeterminacy of 
translation”, by improving the instruments and the physical idealisation representing 
the concrete experimental setting, the indeterminacy will never be entirely removed. 
Besides, the enhanced precision will be in most cases purchased at the price of having 
to rely on more physical theory. The measure of the length of a rod with a ruler and the 
naked eye requires a minimum amount of theoretical assumptions but leads to a result 
with an error of, at best, half a millimetre. To attain in the same kind of measurement a 
level of precision one thousand times greater, we may employ optical means.17 A huge 
body of scientific theorising will be therefore relied upon, both for the realisation of 
the required procedure and for the control over possible interference from the 
environment (for instance, virtually no variation of the temperature could be allowed in 
the laboratory).
17 See Giannoni in Harding, 1976, p. 165.
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3. Hence it is possible to conclude that a phenomenon reveals its fine structure only 
under the condition that a deep knowledge of its relations with other phenomena has 
been attained, which in turn requires a vast network of physical theories. A deeper 
knowledge requires a more extensive one.
1.3 The Duhem Thesis
We can now state the Duhem Thesis in its original formulation. The foregoing analysis 
leads to the following conclusion:
In sum, the physicist can never subject an isolated hypothesis to 
experimental test, but only a whole group of hypotheses; when the 
experiment is in disagreement with his predictions, what he learns is 
that at least one of the hypotheses constituting this group is 
unacceptable and ought to be modified; but the experiment does not 
designate which one should be changed.18
Traditionally the claims summarised in this passage have been rephrased in two 
distinct theses:
The Separability Thesis (S): No single or individual theoretical hypothesis by itself has
any observable consequences.19
The Falsifiability Thesis (F): No single theoretical hypothesis can be conclusively
falsified by any observations.
Philip Quinn20 has tried to show that F is not a logical consequence of S. In his view 
holism does not prohibit that the conjunction of two hypotheses (Hj &  Hj) may have an
18 ASPT, p. 187.
19 A long conjunction of hypotheses should not be considered as a “single or individual hypothesis”.
20 Quinn, 1969, pp. 47-48.*
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observable consequence O (which will consist of the description of a brute fact). He 
then imagines a case in which one component of such a pair of hypotheses im p ly in g  
the observable consequence, say Hj, is conclusively verified. In this situation an 
empirical finding (-  O) contradicting the prediction of the conjunction would 
unambiguously falsify Hj. Quinn concludes that F is not a logical consequence of S, for 
in order to establish F one needs to rule out the possibility that a hypothesis can be 
conclusively verified. He then retracted his opinion21 following a criticism by Nancy 
Tuana22, who has showed that in the above situation S cannot be true. If the hypothesis 
Hj has been conclusively verified, argues Tuana, there must exist a set of observation 
sentences O* whose truth implies the truth of Hj. But then the conjunction of -  O and 
O* entails the falsity of Hj, from which we can derive by logical rules that Hj itself 
entails the disjunction of O and -  O*. Hence in the situation discussed by Quinn Hj 
would have its own empirical consequences against thesis S.23
Tuana also shows that F is a logical consequence of S. If we assume that F is false, 
this means that a particular hypothesis Hj can be conclusively falsified by observation. 
Interpreting this possibility to mean that there is an observation O that entails the 
falsity of Hi, we can easily see that in this situation Hi would entail -  O, against what 
stated by S.
I do agree that F is a consequence of S, but I have other reservations about Quinn’s 
arguments that go beyond Tuana’s criticism. Quinn clearly assumes that it is 
meaningful to consider scientific hypotheses as sharply distinguished units. In the light 
of Duhem’s analysis this seems doubtful. The trick of considering the conjunction of 
Pa>o hypotheses in order to overcome the prohibition resulting from S is hardly 
acceptable when the practical difficulty of counting the hypotheses involved in an 
experiment is taken into consideration. If the experimenter assumes that the presence 
in the laboratory of his body and that of his assistant are not distorting an electrical 
field under study, how many hypotheses is he relying on? Should he simply assume 
that two human bodies of a certain mass have negligible electromagnetic effects, or 
should he be more careful and distinguish between the potential effect of the 
experimenters’ bodies and that due to the metal watches they are wearing? Is he
21 Quinn, 1978.
22 Tuana, 1978, p. 458.
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accepting a hypothesis concerning the sheer total mass of the bodies or does it make a 
difference for him if that mass is distributed in two parts that move around 
independently in the laboratory? An experimenter normally works in an ocean of 
implicit assumptions, he is normally not even aware of, and that would resist a precise 
enumeration. When something goes wrong he does not have at hand a full list of 
hypotheses to read through in search of the one to blame; he has to understand the 
cause of the failure, and this may require a good deal of imagination and further 
experimentation. The vagueness of the so-called ceteris paribus clauses should suffice
• • 24to convince of this. I will add later further arguments to the effect that the 
interpretation of an experiment is always based on a kind of pragmatic judgement that 
cannot be equated to the clear statement of a conjunction of hypotheses from which the 
result of the experiment can be literally deduced.
Besides, the idea that a theoretical hypothesis can be conclusively established by 
observation runs against the simplest analysis of inductive inference. Of course Quinn 
is trying to make a logical point, he is trying to understand whether F is, strictly 
speaking, a logical consequence of S. But if Quinn was so worried about formal 
deduction, he should have also considered the case of a conjunction of two hypotheses 
(let us for a moment suppose that it makes sense to talk in this way), one of which is 
known by the experimenter to be true a priori, and that jointly imply an observable 
consequence. In this case, if the observation runs against the prediction we would 
know which of our two hypotheses is to be blamed. Quinn would then want to say that 
F is not a logical consequence of S alone, but of the conjunction of S with a thesis such 
as “there exists no sentence known to be true a priori, that jointly with an empirical
25 •hypothesis entails observable consequences.” Note that Tuana’s criticism would not
23 This argument is endorsed also by Roger Anew (1984), who rightly insists on the centrality of S in 
Duhem’s thought.
24 The same consideration would apply if one were to reformulate Quinn’s argument considering the 
conjunction of n hypotheses n-1 of which are conclusively confirmed by observations (as it is done for 
instance by Curd and Cover, 1998, p. 356).
25 In the context of Duhem’s holism, the propositions of mathematics and geometry are not considered 
literally as part of the backlog of assumptions the physicists work with, for according to him their truth 
is established independently of any speculation about the external world (as it is well-known Quine 
holds a contrary view on this point, see further, section 2.2). Therefore the alleged sentences known to 
be true a priori should amount to something like the Kantian universal laws of nature, or like the 
Cartesian ftmdamental principles of natural philosophy, such as the non-existence of vacuum (Kant, for 
instance, thought that the dependence of gravitational attraction from the inverse of the square of the 
distance constituted a logical necessity, see Kant, 1953, pp. 82-84). The possibility of a priori physical
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apply to this argument, for it is based on the assumption that it is a set O* of 
observations that conclusively establishes the truth of a hypothesis.
I have insisted on this minor point only because I believe that Quinn’s error is 
indicative of a tendency to reduce the problem of holism to a logical puzzle. The real 
import of Duhem’s analysis is to be found in the discussion of the role of theory in the 
actual practice of experimentation, and it is born out of a detailed study of how 
physicists really work. Also in this sense Duhem was anticipating the general attitude 
of post-positivist epistemology.26 It is the real complexity of experimentation that must 
be taken into account, if the nature of holism is to be understood.
Let us now summarise the consequences of the Duhem Thesis:
1. In order to test a physical hypothesis it is necessary to rely on a wide set of 
assumptions. The more precision is required in the experiment, the wider the set of 
background assumptions will be.
2. Hence a contradiction between the result of the experiment (i.e. between the 
theoretical interpretation of the experiment) and the consequences derived from the 
introduction of the hypothesis under test cannot be considered a conclusive refutation 
of the latter. Experience does not tell us which one of our assumptions needs to be 
replaced. Refutation is always ambiguous.
3. Physics is not a structure made out of hypotheses that can be compared with 
experience one by one. It is a holistic system that faces the judgement of experience, 
maybe not in its entirety, but only through the involvement of a large part of it. In 
general this portion increases with the level of precision required.
4. There is no crucial experiment in physics leading to the conclusive refutation of a 
hypothesis, since it is always possible to blame one of the assumptions that make
knowledge is not even considered by contemporary physicists, but the same can be said about the 
possibility of establishing conclusively the truth of a hypothesis with a finite set of observations.
6 In addition to the importance attributed by Duhem to the theoiy-ladenness of experimentation and, 
from a methodological point of view, to the study of the history of science.
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possible its being put under test, or its connection with the rest of our theoretical 
knowledge.27
5. Experiments and logic, whether deductive or inductive are not capable by 
themselves of guiding the choice of the physicist. There is a degree of freedom in the 
evaluation of the experimental evidence. The physicist must decide also on the ground 
of his "good sense" whether a hypothesis needs to be abandoned in the face of contrary 
experience.
1.4 The motivation for the Duhem Thesis: the theory-ladenness of
experimentation.
In order to test Newton’s law of gravitation we must surely rely on other purely 
theoretical hypotheses such as the principles of dynamics. This case of holistic 
entanglement has nothing to do with the particular experimental technique that is 
adopted in the course of a specific test. The inseparability of Newton’s law from the 
classical principles of dynamics (or from hypothetical substitutes of them) is purely 
theoretical; crucially it would be present even in a thought-experiment. This is the 
situation that we are more likely to find in testing any abstract law or hypothesis. 
However Duhem’s analysis, as just exposed, besides providing examples of various 
kinds, yields a general argument for holism: the theory-ladenness of the interpretation 
of the observable aspect of an experiment. The necessarily holistic nature of theory 
testing in physics is a consequence of the need to translate what is actually observed 
into the language of physics. This translation ends up in a scientific judgement that is
27 This is a logical consequence of holism. Duhem is aware of it, but he also gives another argument 
(independent from holism) to show that crucial experiments are impossible: the physicist can never be 
sure that the two theoretical alternatives tested in a so-called crucial experiment are the only conceivable 
ones. This in turn refutes the idea, again independently of holism, that a crucial experiment can 
conclusively demonstrate a hypothesis true, by refuting its competitor (see ASPT, pp. 180-190). For a 
detailed analysis of this twofold attack on the idea of crucial experiment, see Quinn, 1969, pp. 39-46.
28 Adolf Grunbaum has individuated another source of holism (Griinbaum in Nagel, 1971, pp. 72-74). 
Some hypotheses need simply to be made precise before they can be tested. Grunbaum mentions the 
hypothesis of the spontaneous generation of life. In order to test the theory we have to add the 
qualification that the time in which abiogenesis should occur needs to be very short compared to man’s 
life span. Indeed without this qualification the theory of abiogenesis, far from being refuted, is correctly 
accepted by those who investigate the origin of life on the Earth!
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built (also) upon several common-sense judgements; the difference between these two 
kinds of judgement being that the latter is based on ordinary observation, while the 
former is dependent upon a set of theoretical assumptions.
Duhem’s holism is based on the claim that there is a sharp discontinuity between 
common-sense knowledge and physical knowledge, between observation and
29experiment. Holism is, in physics, a consequence of the theory-ladenness o f  
experimentation.
1.5 The Duhem Thesis and underdetermination
How does the ambiguity of falsification relate to the usual formulation of 
underdetermination, i.e. empirical evidence underdetermines the choice of theories?
It is very important to notice that, although Duhem uses very often the notion of 
underdetermination in order to discredit scientific realism, he does not stress the 
relationship between that notion and his holistic thesis. Duhem sees 
underdetermination essentially as a logical consequence of the hypothetico-deductive 
method. Given that the theorist can do no more than suggest a hypothesis consistent 
with the known phenomena, he can never be sure that some other hypotheses would 
not do the same job just as well. Duhem, on this point, has not much more to add to 
what Aquinas said in his commentary on Aristotle’s De Caelo about the cosmological 
systems of the time:
The assumptions of those people (the astrologers) are not necessarily 
true. Although they save the appearances by suppositions constructed 
in this way, one ought not to say that these suppositions are true, 
because one might save the appearances concerning the stars equally 
well by means of some other method not yet understood by men.30
29 Alexandre Koyre has stressed the fact that the innovative aspect of Scientific Revolution consisted not 
so much in the recognition of the importance of observation (astronomers and naturalists had always 
based their work on observation, and, up to a certain extent, this is true also of the alchemists), but rather 
in the adoption of a methodology based on experimentation. (See, for instance, Koyre, 1943, p. 401).
30 Aquinas, Ad. Lect. XVII, book 2, ii. Quoted by Duhem in Physics and Metaphysics, EHPS, p. 41.
26
Seen in this way underdetermination has nothing to do with holism. Indeed in The Aim 
and Structure the arguments against realism based on underdetermination (a word that, 
by the way, Duhem never uses) precede the famous discussion of the relation between 
theory and experiment that constitutes the basis of the Duhem Thesis.31
The question is then whether holism adds further credibility to the thesis that 
empirical evidence underdetermines the choice of theory. The first thing to stress is 
that the logical possibility to retain a hypothesis in the face of a disconfirming result by 
blaming another hypothesis assumed in the course of the experiment, does not ensure 
us in any way that the hypothesis retained can be made part of a non trivial explanation 
of that result. Duhem never upholds such a view,32 which lacks logical support. If this 
were the case, then the step from holism to underdetermination would be, up to a 
certain extent, a short one.
In point of logic, from the fact that scientific hypotheses apply to phenomena only 
collectively it does not follow that there are many empirically equivalent theories for 
each range of phenomena. Moreover, as I will explain later, the theory-ladennes o f 
experimentation renders problematic the very idea o f empirical equivalence (and 
hence o f underdetermination).
What can be said instead is that the holistic nature of theory testing adds new 
degrees of freedom to the theorist’s search for a successful theory. This is certainly 
what Duhem had in mind while discussing the case in which an experiment has refuted 
a system of hypotheses:
No absolute principle directs this inquiry, which different physicists 
may conduct in very different ways without having the right to accuse 
one another of illogicality. For instance, one may be obliged to 
safeguard certain fundamental hypotheses while he tries to reestablish 
harmony between the consequences of the theory and the facts by 
complicating the schematism in which these hypotheses are applied, 
by invoking various causes of error, and by multiplying corrections.
The next physicist, disdainful of these complicated artificial
31 Certainly the holistic thesis lends further support to Duhem’s antirealist conception of physical theory.
32 Contrary to what Grunbaum asserted in one of his articles on the subject (Grunbaum, in Harding, 
1976, p. 117). Also Quine is explicit on this point.
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procedures, may decide to change some one of the essential 
assumptions supporting the entire system. The first physicist does not 
have the right to condemn in advance the boldness of the second one, 
nor does the latter have the right to treat the timidity of the first 
physicist as absurd.33
Here we have the synthetic description of two different research programmes.34 
Holism increases the number of paths that the physicist can legitimately follow in the 
light of experimental results. In sum:
Holism enhances the possibility o f the multiplication o f research programmes.
What the destiny of these research programmes will be, is a different matter. Certainly 
these further degrees of freedom in the construction of theories render much more 
plausible that different underdetermined theories may be build; but we cannot go much 
further than this.35
1.5.1 Physical laws: underdetermination due to approximation and due to symbolic 
expression
In this section I will analyse the consequences of Duhem’s analysis concerning the 
status of physical laws: they are symbolic and approximate. In doing so we will find 
two types of underdetermination that are peculiar to physics. We will also have the 
chance to see in a different way in what sense the duhemian account of 
experimentation lends support to underdetermination. In doing so I will again draw 
consequences that are not explicitly stated by Duhem.
Due to the one-to-many correspondence between a practical fact and its theoretical 
exact counterparts, any set of data is compatible with an infinity of different physical
33 ASPT, pp. 216-217.
341 use this expression in a broader and more liberal sense than the strictly lakatosian one.
35 Duhem believed that in case both of the physicists mentioned in the quotation succeeded in their 
search for consistency with experiments, only good sense could lead to the correct choice of which 
theory should be accepted (ASPT pp. 217-248).
28
laws, no matter how much the precision of the experiments has been improved. Hence, 
according to Duhem, physical laws are strictly speaking neither true nor false, they are 
approximate.36 Moreover they are provisional, since an improvement in the 
experimental technique, or else, in the theoretical analysis might reveal that an 
accepted law must be corrected. We find here a first example of a kind of 
underdetermination. It is clear that empirical data leave us the freedom to choose 
among infinite alternatives. I believe this is the only non-trivial kind of 
underdetermination that is likely to be in action at each step of the work of a physicist. 
By itself it is not so much a consequence of holism, but simply of the fact that physics 
adopts a mathematical language (a fact which is, of course, also a major source of 
holism). To be sure, it is really a kind of pragmatic underdetermination, rather than one 
in principle, for the different laws do make slightly different predictions. However, no 
matter how much we improve the precision of our measurement, we will never get rid 
completely of the indeterminacy due to approximation.
Let us see how this kind of underdetermination can be dealt with in practice. How 
can we direct our choice? To look for simplicity and elegance is a normal way of going 
about, but following it will not always suffice (not to mention the everlasting problem 
of defining those concepts unambiguously). Many alternatives, Duhem points out, are 
naturally discarded on the ground of their incompatibility with physical theory. He 
argues however that, the latter being only a means of classifying known physical 
regularities, we will not be able to rely on it as if it were an impartial truthful tribunal. 
Suppose that from an accepted theory we deduce a law, which corresponds with the 
empirical data within the limit of error. An infinite number of other laws will indeed fit 
the data just as well, although they might be in contrast with the predictions of the 
theory. In such a case, every physicist would regard the experiment as a success for the 
theory and would retain the law deduced from it, unless he or she had in mind an 
alternative theory from which one of the rival laws could be deduced.
36 This Duhemian tenet follows from the preceding analysis only if an antirealist conception of truth is 
accepted. A realist could try to argue that, although we can only know a law in an approximate way, 
there is in reality the true variant of it. Duhem is not entirely explicit about his conception of truth. 
However he certainly would reject a realist account of the truth of the laws of nature. The situation is 
somewhat complicated by Duhem’s faith (as he would call it) that physical theory tends in the long run 
to approximate a natural classification of phenomena; but this faith is kept by Duhem outside his logical 
reconstruction of the cognitive status of physics (see ASPT, pp. 19-30, 293-298 and EHPS, pp. 68, 236- 
237).
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Let us consider Duhem's example. We want to determine the daily path of the sun 
in Paris with the highest precision attainable at the moment. After using the best 
optical instruments and taking into account all known effects influencing the results of 
the observation (due for instance to the presence of the atmosphere), we will find 
ourselves with a bundle constituted by an infinity of different trajectories. Further, an 
infinite subset of this bundle will be compatible with our celestial mechanics. To 
suggest that this subset should be chosen means to supplement the demand that 
theories be correspondent to experiments with a coherence criterion. It should also be 
noticed that, in this case, there seem to be sharp boundaries to the possible theoretical 
choices underdetermined by empirical data: all trajectories are roughly the same: the 
sun rises from the east and sets every day in the west. The absolute truth of common- 
sense laws sets a limit to the possible divergence of acceptable experimental results.
Duhem would certainly be very pleased by this conclusion, which indeed can be 
considered as a direct consequence of the role he attributes to le bon sense in his 
methodology. As a painter can improve a portrait by adding or modifying its details, 
but not by altering it completely, similarly physics can make our common-sense 
knowledge more precise, but will have to preserve its essential traits.37 It is this kind of 
methodological attitude that leads Duhem to regard the theory of Special Relativity as 
literally absurd.38
Physical laws are symbolic expressions because they express connections of 
theoretical facts. Let us contrast again physical laws with common-sense ones. It is not 
the case that the mere introduction of symbols in the expression of a law makes a great 
difference from an epistemological point of view, contrary to what Duhem suggests at 
some point.39 Rather, as he later explains clearly, what matters is that the symbols of 
physical laws owe their meaning to physical theory. Only physical theory can relate 
them to actual states of affairs through their double function of providing and 
interpreting measurement procedures. Indeed to express the common-sense law "all 
men are mortal" in a symbolic way such as "(x) M(X)<Mort(x)", will not affect its 
meaning and truth value. On the contrary:
37 The metaphor of the painter is very frequent in Duhem’s writings.
38 According to Duhem it is an undeniable fact of experience that space and time are independent of one 
another (see EHPS, pp. 270-273).
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According to whether we adopt one theory or another, the very words 
which figure in a physical law change their meaning, so that the law 
may be accepted by one physicist who admits a certain theory and 
rejected by another physicist who admits some other theory. (...) A 
physical law is a symbolic relation whose application to concrete 
reality requires that a whole group of laws be known and accepted.40
From the symbolic character of physical laws it also follows again that they are 
provisional, but in a different sense. No physical law has a scope of application that 
can be defined once and forever, for the simple reason that there is an infinity of 
different conditions under which it can be tested. The law of compressibility and 
expansion of oxygen ceases to be valid if the gas under study is placed between the 
plates of a strongly charged condenser: it must be substituted by a more complex 
expression containing the symbol representing the electric field. In what sense has the 
law changed? In the sense that the original law has now a more restricted field of 
application. We can never be sure that an analogous modification will not be needed as 
a consequence of new kinds of experiments. This fact is a consequence of the symbolic 
character of laws, because
... there are always cases in which the symbols related by a law are no 
longer capable of representing reality in a satisfactory manner.41
While the terms present in common-sense laws correspond to a fixed class of objects 
or facts, the symbols of theoretical physics are introduced in the description of a range 
of phenomena whose boundaries can be redefined by further experimentation.
The preceding quotations suggest the possibility of a kind of underdetermination 
different from the one due to approximation: it is sometimes possible to choose 
different, symbols with a different meaning in order to represent the same experimental 
situation. A simple example, I believe, is provided by the attempts to explain capillary 
phenomena. In the seventeenth-century many physicists belonging to the Newtonian
39 ASPT, p. 168.
40 ASPT, p. 167-168.
41 ASPT, p. 174.
31
school (such as Laplace) argued that the mathematical form of Newton’s equation was 
to be corrected in order to explain the phenomenon of capillary attraction.42 We now 
interpret the latter as a consequence of electromagnetic interaction between molecules. 
Thus we have two theoretical pictures that invoke different theoretical concepts and 
would translate the same brute facts into two essentially different symbolic 
judgements.
Hence we find here two different sources of underdetermination: approximation 
and symbolism. It is clear that even if it were possible to perform measurements that 
lead to exact mathematical results, we could not rule out the possibility that more than 
one theory implying these results could be devised. However, the approximation 
necessarily involved in any empirical data enhances the likelihood of there being (from 
a pragmatic point of view) empirically equivalent theories, since two theories may be 
said, in practice, to be empirically equivalent43 and hence underdetermined by 
empirical evidence, just in case their predictions differ by a (at the moment) non- 
detectable amount. Approximation is sufficient but not necessary to the presence of 
underdetermination.
1.6 To save the phenomena
Another formulation of the problem of underdetermination could be the following: 
there are different ways of “saving” the same phenomena. The problem is that in order 
to be meaningful this formulation must include a specification of what the phenomena 
that should be saved by a theory amount to. We assume that we are confronted with 
something fixed and given on one side, the phenomena, and with a set of possibilities 
on the other, the set of theories underdetermined by the phenomena. Here we face the 
most serious problem of this analysis: what do we mean by phenomena? In this section 
I will try to answer to this question drawing on Duhem’s philosophy o f physics. For
42 Curiously enough, Duhem himself still considered this the only available solution (see ASPT, p. 177), 
and coherently he does not use the example of capillary phenomena to illustrate underdetermination.
43 See further for a more detailed account of the notion of empirical equivalence.
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this purpose I will contrast the different roles assumed by the observable phenomena 
respectively in ancient astronomy and in modern physical experimentation.44
One of the chief examples of underdetermination arose in the context of the ancient 
debate over cosmological systems. The various schools of astronomers were proposing 
different ways to save the same phenomena,45 that is the apparent motions of celestial 
bodies. It should be noticed however that the different cosmological systems were 
meant to provide quantitative predictions about the motions, for instance, of the 
planets. For an astronomical theory, to save the phenomena means to predict the 
mathematical translation of what is observed in the sky. Indeed an astronomical theory 
is a system of geometrical and mathematical postulates; hence it can be used only for 
the deduction of prediction in mathematical form. We thus find five different levels:
1. The sensible appearances in the sky of phenomena such as stars, phases of the 
moon, eclipses, etc. (i.e. brute facts).
2. The approximate description of these phenomena in geometrical and mathematical 
terms (i.e. practical facts).
3. The infinite sets of theoretical facts corresponding to the practical facts.
4. The corresponding predictions of the various theories.
5. The different theories.
This schematisation suggests the following
Definition: a theory T saves the phenomena if it maps past practical facts into 
predicted practical facts that are compatible with the practical facts that actually obtain.
44 Duhem does insist that the aim of physical theory is to save the phenomena, but he does not seem to 
realise that his analysis of the relation between theory and experiment, an analysis that, as we have seen, 
emphasises the theory-ladenness of experimental practices, renders more difficult to appreciate the 
meaning of that claim.
45 For simplicity, I will assume in this discussion that the determination of the celestial motions was 
unproblematic. This is, of course, historically false.
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In order to test a theory we need (so to speak) to feed  into it the results of some 
observations, that is some practical facts, and then work out a prediction. The 
prediction will be a practical fact, which is an infinite set of theoretical facts (typically 
an interval centred on a particular value). The final step consists of comparing the 
prediction with the result of a new observation that is with another practical fact. What 
is required for the theory to pass the test, is not that the predicted practical fact be 
identical with the observed one, but compatible. In practice we can often talk of 
compatibility when the value at the centre of the interval defining the predicted 
practical fact lies within the interval defining the observed practical fact.46
Let us analyse the consequences of this definition for physical science in general:
1. If by observational basis we mean what is (or should be) actually used to confirm 
or disconfirm theories, the observational basis of physics is constituted by practical 
facts.
2. Thus the phenomena saved by physical theory are the practical facts, not what is 
actually experienced.
3. We can say that we face a problem of underdetermination when more than one 
theory saves the phenomena.
4. In general those underdetermined theories would make slightly different 
predictions, that, however, will be compatible with the same practical facts.
46 This picture is very simplified and idealised, mainly for two reasons:
1. There are many different opinions about how to define the so-called interval o f  confidence 
associated with a measurement result, even in the context of the same physical analysis of the 
experiment. The set of theoretical facts corresponding to a practical fact has, in general, vague 
boundaries. In most cases physicists would assume that the agreement between theoretical predictions 
and experimental results comes in degree. In other words, there are many ways, according to the 
situation, to define the concept of compatibility.
2. The relation between theory and experiment is usually more complex. In real science competing 
theories will in general all disagree with some facts. Moreover, mainly for the problem of ceteris 
paribus clauses, the acknowledgement of anomalies can be very controversial. Finally, the lack both of 
computational methods and of experimental techniques may prevent physicists from actually performing 
various tests that could be in principle highly significant.
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5. Hence what remain fixed, while we consider the various underdetermined theories, 
are the “observed” practical facts, not the theoretical facts.
6. In conclusion, to say that physical theory is aimed at saving the phenomena means 
to say that its aim is compatibility with practical facts.
7. Theories are not underdetermined by the brute facts, but by their interpretations.
8. We notice again the various competing theories can indeed be very different, but 
none of them could ever be in sharp (brute?) disagreement with brute facts. This is a 
weak sense in which one could say that physical theories save what is actually 
manifest to the senses.
The first of the five levels of description is (following Duhem) the only “purely” 
empirical one. In order to get from the first to second level we need to replace celestial 
bodies with geometrical idealisations and then refer to the latter the mathematical 
descriptions of the apparent motions. This second level is what is saved by the 
theories. Nevertheless, between the first and the second level there is in this case a 
good correspondence: on one hand the theoretical interpretation required is in this case 
very limited, on the other hand even at the second level of description we are adopting 
symbols that refer directly to the individual objects belonging to the first level: this 
circle in the map of the sky represents the Moon, this point represents Mars. This is 
why consequence number 8 is particularly appropriate in this case. The translation 
between the first and the second level is so immediate (the “linguistic” gap is so 
narrow) that the theories can be said, with some licence, to entail (also) what is directly 
perceived with the eyes.
Can a physical experiment be described in such a way that we could individuate 
certain aspects of the experiment that are purely empirical and contrast them with those 
that are theoretical? If we adopt Duhem's point of view about common-sense 
knowledge the answer seems to be positive. We can describe the physical apparatus, its 
parts and the place in which it has been situated. We can moreover describe the part of
Therefore, “empirically equivalent” is, in practice, a vague predicate.
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the apparatus that will yield a readable result. Let us restrict ourselves to the case in 
which a certain measurement is being performed. Any such experiment will require a 
certain set of objects, connected to each other in a certain way and ultimately 
connected to a device on which a number can be read. The entire apparatus, including 
the mode of presentation of the reading, will constitute part of the “phenomenal side” 
of the experiment. Only the conventional link between the symbols adopted and the 
real number concepts to which they refer has no physical character whatsoever.
According to Duhem it would be possible in principle to describe minutely each of 
these components adopting a common-sense language. For that purpose we should 
simply describe them in the same way a person without any knowledge of physics 
would do.47 The word "conductor", for instance, could not figure in this description, 
since it is parasitic on the concept of charge and along with it on a good deal of theory 
about electrical phenomena; similarly all physical concepts such as “temperature”, 
“pressure” or “electrical current” should be omitted. A word such as "metal" or 
"copper" on the other hand would be admissible.
It is by now time to notice that things are not quite as easy as Duhem thought. His 
idea that the layman-language could state common-sense facts unambiguously is beset 
by many difficulties. What predicates are, after all, available to our hypothetical 
layman? Would he be able to say that a certain column of glass is filled with mercury, 
or could he only mention the presence of a silver-like liquid in that column? Besides, a 
fin  du siecle layman could certainly speak of metals, but with what competence? Could 
he tell apart iron from steel or magnetite or from a hundred different but seemingly 
alike metals? Not even a fin  du siecle physicist could tell apart substances that we have 
now recognised/classified as different. And what kind of description would a native
48inhabitant of Bali make of Duhem’s laboratory in his own language? Duhem does 
not attempt to give an answer to these questions. His view of common-sense 
knowledge is rather traditional, not to say dogmatic. We will see that Quine, on the 
contrary, provides a sophisticated account of the relation between language and reality, 
which avoids the notion of unambiguous common-sense facts, and yet holds fast the 
distinction between the observational and the theoretical.
47 ASPT, p. 164. Duhem stresses that the resulting translation would be extremely long and complicated 
and most of all obscure.
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However, for the moment, I intend to follow Duhem on this point and assume that 
every-day-facts are obviously given to us in a certain way, which is in turn expressible 
by every-day language. The following considerations remain valid also if Quine’s 
philosophy of language is taken into account.
Let us then suppose that we can give a “theory-free” description of an experimental 
setting along with its conditions throughout the execution of the experiment. What 
would be the relation between this description and set of phenomena (in the sense of 
consequence number 2) we intend to save? Could it play the same role in modern 
physics that the apparent motion of the planets played in the discussions among 
Medieval and Renaissance astronomers? The answer is no. Let us see why.
According to Duhem the most important part of the test consists really in the 
interpretation of the experiment. We compare the prediction of the theory with the 
interpretation of the experiment. If we find a contradiction, then we must change 
something in our theoretical knowledge or in the interpretation of the experiment. But 
we don't have a contradiction between the hypothesis under test and the empirical 
evidence by itself. The contradiction is not between the facts really observed and the 
theory, but between the latter and the idealised, theoretical interpretation of the 
experiment which is present in the mind of the experimenter.
We can now see the crucial difference between the execution of a normal physical 
experiment and the observation of the apparent motion of the planets. It lies in the fact 
that in the former the actual observable appearances (reported in the layman 
description o f the experiment) is but a representative o f the equivalence class o f  brute 
facts that correspond, to the same practical fact, obtained through interpretation (the 
practical fact in turn will correspond to an infinity of theoretical facts, hence the 
relation brute-practical-theoretical fact is a many-to-one-to-many relation).
Imagine that we perform the same experiment, with the only difference that all 
copper wires have been replaced by silver wires endowed with the same (up to the 
required level of approximation) electrical characteristics as the former. The 
interpretation of the experiment remains unchanged. We have hence realised a unique 
practical fact in two different brute facts. Let us imagine that the experiment does 
confirm the theory, which will be in this case standard electromagnetism. Then, to say
48 A locus classicus against the idea that common-sense predicates can be applied without ambiguity is:
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that the theory saves the phenomena means to say that its predictions are compatible 
with the practical facts which a (generally) much wider body of theoretical 
assumptions put in correspondence with a potentially infinite class of different brute 
facts.
Imagine all the possible realisations of a particular oscillating circuit. It may well be 
that some of them have nothing in common from the common-sense point of view with 
some others; yet the physicist will consider them as instances of the same concept, the 
concept “oscillating circuit having such and such characteristics” (including the value 
of the capacity of the condenser, and so on). We could say that the intension of the 
concept is what the theory deals with; the extension is the set of all possible concrete 
realisations in terms of brute facts. The background knowledge is what is required in 
order to establish that a certain pattern of brute facts belongs to the extension of the 
concept, i.e. that it constitutes an embodiment o f a certain ideal-type (the concept), 
defined solely by abstract properties. From now on, I will call ideal-type of a theory a 
pattern of theoretical facts defined solely in the language of the theory and complex 
enough to illustrate some nomological consequences of the theory. Examples of ideal- 
types are normally given by the physical situations described at the beginning of the 
exercises in standard physics textbooks. The requirement of complexity is easily 
understood when we think that a simple theoretical fact such as “there is a rigid rod of 
length 3.12 m” cannot be used by itself to illustrate the predictions of classical 
mechanics. In order to do this we will have to describe a more complicated situation 
(involving the forces acting on the rod, its degrees of freedom, etc.).
Electromagnetism enables us for instance to predict that an oscillating circuit, 
composed by a capacitor, an inductance and a resistor has a certain resonance 
frequency. Theories deal with ideal-types, which in turn represent classes of concrete
49situations.
Hence, in an experiment of physics it can happen that nothing that is actually 
sensed is really necessary, because it could be replaced in virtue of background
K. Popper, 1968.
49 Here and in the following sections I will disregard, for the sake of simplicity, the distinction that one 
should draw between theoretical ideal-types and practical ideal-types. This distinction obviously 
mirrors that between theoretical and practical facts. Strictly speaking, a concrete situation can be seen as 
the instantiation of an infinity of theoretical ideal-types. However I have already noticed that the biggest 
interpretative step is taken in relating brute facts to practical ones, not the latter to theoretical facts.
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knowledge by something else, provided that this can play the same role in the 
experiment.
On the contrary, in the case of ancient astronomy the second and third level of 
description did not constitute an ideal-type, they were really representations of 
something particular. This does not seem at all surprising if we think that the theories 
under discussion were not properly nomological: they were descriptions of the 
structure of a particular set of objects (the celestial bodies). It is only with the theory of 
gravitation that the Sun, the Planets and the Earth got out of the picture to give way to 
a system of masses in mutual interaction (laws require abstract concepts). At the 
second and third level of description we now find an ideal-type consisting of a 
particular many-body gravitational system and the Solar System has now become just 
a gigantic experimental setting in which the predictions of the theory concerning the 
ideal-type are tested by means of a concrete realisation. Although Newton’s theory still 
predicts what we actually see in the sky, even the existence of the Solar System is 
irrelevant for the meaning and the truth of the theory.50
To illustrate this fact we can consider an imaginary situation in which an ancient 
and a modern astronomer witness together an extraordinary event: the moon leaves its 
orbit and goes astray. The astonishment of the first astronomer will be due not so much 
to the impression that his theory has been refuted, but to the fact that the part of reality 
the theory was meant to describe has changed. Strictly speaking there is no refutation, 
for what has happened is that the description of a particular object, the Solar System, 
has been outdated by an intrinsic modification of that very object.51 The modern 
astronomer would instead try to explain the event seeking a new ideal-type under 
which the Solar System can be subsumed. This attempt may or may not lead to
50 This example explains why I prefer the term “ideal-type” to the more common “physical system”. 
Tire latter is often used also to refer to particular concrete situations. The solar system is a physical 
system, but only an instantiation of an ideal-type, not an ideal-type. The term “model” is also used to 
refer to particular situations. Moreover physicists often talk about models when the resources of a 
theory are deemed insufficient by themselves to give a faithful account of a specific phenomenon. A 
model is not in this case an ideal situation to which the theory perfectly applies, but, on the contrary, an 
ad hoc description to the formulation of which the theory has only contributed.
51 One could object to this conclusion on the ground that according to tire ancient cosmology no change 
could occur in the heaven. However this belief was based on (meta-)physical considerations about the 
nature of the elements and their intrinsic properties, which astronomers where not concerned with, for 
their only aim was to save the actual phenomena. The imaginary situation would have upset aristotelian 
physics, not the methods of book-keeper-like astronomers (on the ancient separation between astronomy 
and physics see, for instance, Drake, 1980).
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abandoning Newton’s theory, depending on whether he can suggest a theoretical 
interpretation of the event consistent with Newton’s theory.
The theories developed along the history of science have generally become more 
and more abstract. Newton’s theory, or the theory of heat have still a phenomenal side 
that we could call in a loose way ostensive, for they refer to classes of objects or facts 
that belong also to common-sense knowledge. With electromagnetism this ostensive 
character has become even weaker. Finally Twentieth Century particle physics has 
produced theories that do not refer directly in any way to something that can be 
observed. Their dictionary does not contain any term that belongs to common-sense 
knowledge, nor that is easily related to it. With respect to them even Newtonian talk 
about masses seems after all referring to something open to our gaze. We cannot point 
at something and be sure that what we are seeing has something to do with the 
predictions of the standard model of particle physics, for it is only background 
knowledge that can tell us if and when a pattern of observable facts embodies an ideal- 
type of the theory. The price to be paid for enriching our knowledge with extremely 
abstract and general theories lies in their remoteness from every-day observation.
1.6.1 To save theory-laden phenomena
Duhem defended the thesis that the aim of physics is to save the phenomena52 The 
Greeks coined this expression in order to define the aim of the science at that time 
called astronomy. Drawing on Duhem’s analysis of the relation between theory and 
experiment in physics, it is possible to say that the meaning of that motto has now 
changed radically. It is striking that Duhem himself does not show awareness of this 
fact. At first sight, the view suggested by it seems to imply:
1. that the phenomena are “out there”, waiting for us to study them,
2. that physics seeks a correspondence between its theories and the given phenomena.
52 See SP,p. 117.
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The foregoing analysis suggests that on the contrary:
1. physical theory is concerned, not with given phenomena, but with ideal-types, that 
is intellectual abstractions:;
2. the relation between the ideal-types and what is actually observed is mediated by 
physical theory (in general, background knowledge) that tells us what observable 
situation counts as an instance of an ideal-type. This is a reformulation of the thesis 
that experimentation is theory-laden, which in turn provides an argument for the 
Duhem Thesis.
3. Hence theory is necessary to shape the phenomena, which in turn cannot be 
considered as pre-existing ready-made entities.
4. As the gap between ideal-types and immediate experience is bridged by theory, it is 
impossible to confront theoretical hypotheses directly with reality. Thus physical 
investigation cannot be based on a naive correspondence theory of truth. This is a 
reformulation of the Duhem Thesis and, indeed, a consequence of conclusion 2.
Hence, physical theory does not simply save the phenomena in the old sense, it also 
contributes to their very structure; it saves something that, as it is, would not exist 
without it.
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2. QUINEAN HOLISM
Introduction
The Quine Thesis results from the interplay of the verificationist theory of meaning with 
epistemological holism. The outcome is an all-embracing holism, both semantical and 
epistemological for which only clusters of sentences have empirical significance.
In the first section I briefly recall the gradual emergence of holism within
Neopositivism culminating in Quine’s formulation. In the second section I compare the
Quine Thesis with the Duhem Thesis.
2.1 The Quine Thesis: Holism and Verificationism
Pierre Duhem is mentioned in the famous Neopositivists’ Manifesto among the 
inspirers of the scientific worldview upheld by the Vienna Circle. Carnap recognises in 
the Logische Syntax der Sprache that tests in physics involve, at the bottom level, a 
group of hypotheses and not just a single one. He also mentions that Duhem and 
Poincare had pointed out this fact. Ayer is even more explicit than Carnap:
When one speaks of hypotheses being verified in experience, it is
important to bear in mind that it is never just a single hypothesis
which an observation confirms or discredits, but always a system of 
hypotheses.53
53 Ayer, 1946. p. 94.
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He even draws the conclusion that, from a logical point of view, the falsification of a 
hypothesis is never conclusive.
The “facts of experience” can never compel us to abandon a 
hypothesis. A man can always sustain his convictions in the face of 
apparently hostile evidence if he is prepared to make the necessary ad 
hoc assumptions.54
Nevertheless Quine stresses the importance of holism in overthrowing the 
Neopositivistic conception of knowledge:
Carnap shows his appreciation of this [holism] by speaking well of 
Pierre Duhem, who with Poincare and Milhaud, founded 
conventionalism.55 Carnap, like others in the Vienna Circle, didn’t 
follow the consequences of holism sufficiently...
[The renewal of the holistic perspective] marked my separation from 
Carnap.56
We are then stricken by the impression that holism has had on the logical empiricists 
the effect of a time bomb. Quine introduces his holism precisely as stemming from the 
collapse of what he calls the dogma of reductionism. In its radical form the dogma 
amounts to the belief that any meaningful statement can be translated into a statement
54 Ibid., p. 95. Ayer’s holism is not extended to the analytic sentences. However, as we shall see, 
according to Quine, once holism is taken seriously in matter of verification, then the distinction itself 
between analytic and synthetic sentences is doomed. The evaluation of this highly controversial quinean 
tenet lies outside the scope of this work.
55 To rank Duhem as a conventionalist is inaccurate and not simply for his conception of physical theory 
as heading toward a natural classification of phenomena. Duhem criticises Poincare’s tenet that certain 
physical principles have the status of conventions that physicists will never let experience to refute. On 
the contrary, according to Duhem, a new systematisation of physical theory may replace them with 
different ones (see ASPT, pp. 208-212). Vuillemin compares Duhem’s criticism of Poincare’s 
conception of theoretical convention with Quine’s attack on the camapian analytic sentences (see 
Vuillemin in Halm and Schilpp, 1986, p. 596). It should be noted that Vuillemin does not resist the 
temptation of defining Duhem a pragmatist (Ibid., p. 597). However Duhem himself takes the pain to 
reject that label (see EHPS, p. 237). See also Maiocchi, 1990, where The Aim and Structure is defined 
"a book against conventionalism”.
56 Both quotations are taken from an interview to Quine, printed in Borradori, 1994, pp. 29-39.
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about immediate experience. Carnap’s attempt in Der Logische Aufbau der Welt was 
precisely that of providing such a translation in a systematic way. Besides a sense- 
datum language, Carnap included in his attempted translation also logic, set theory and 
mathematics. After realising the impossibility of achieving such a translation,57 Carnap 
opted for a weaker form of reductionism. He deemed possible to introduce reduction 
forms58 that connected sentences in theoretical language with sentences describing 
observable circumstances. This constituted a further attempt to develop a 
verificationist theory o f meaning, based on the idea, which Quine attributes already to 
Peirce,59 that the meaning of a sentence amounts to the difference that its truth would 
make in terms of experience. Carnap had consequently abandoned the dream of 
rendering from a logical point of view redundant all theoretical language. However, 
according to Quine, Carnap is still committed to the belief that a single statement is 
connected, taken in isolation, to a given class of observable circumstances that add to 
the likelihood of its truth.60 Precisely these circumstances could be considered as 
giving factual content or empirical significance to each meaningful statement. It is on 
this point that Quine develops his criticism:
The dogma of reductionism survives in the supposition that each 
statement, taken in isolation from its fellows, can admit of • 
confirmation or infirmation at all. My countersuggestion, issuing 
essentially from Carnap’s doctrine of the physical world in the 
Aufbau, is that our statements about the external world face the 
tribunal of sense experience not individually but only as a corporate 
body. [Footnote: This doctrine was well argued by Duhem, pp. 303- 
328. Or see Lowinger, pp. 132-140.]61
57 See FLPV, pp. 38-41.
58 Carnap, 1936-1937.
59 OR, p. 78.
60 Quine’s reading of the second Carnap is, on this point, historically questionable.
61 FLPV, p. 41.
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Much more recently Quine has declared that at the time he wrote the famous article 
Two Dogmas o f Empiricism (from which the preceding quotation is taken), he did not 
know that Duhem had reached similar conclusions so many years before.62
In Epistemology Naturalised Quine underlines that the failure of the liberalised 
form of reductionism is not due to the difficulty of specifying the observational 
implications of a statement. Even if those were very complex and ramified, it would be 
possible in principle to express them in a tight form, just in the way we axiomatise in a 
finite formulation an infinity of theorems. The problem is by no means practical, the 
problem is that a single statement “has no fund of experiential implications it can call 
its own".63
Quine argues that the first dogma of empiricism, the distinction between analytic 
and synthetic sentences falls with the dogma of reductionism. If it were possible to talk 
about the range of experiences confirming of infirming a single statement, then it 
would be possible to individuate a class of sentences that are true come what may, that 
are, as Quine says, “vacuously confirmed”64 by any observation. This would be the 
class of analytic statements.65 The idea behind the analytic-synthetic distinction is that 
the truth of a sentence is partly linguistic and partly factual. When the factual part were 
absent, we would feel entitled to talk about analytic truth. But, holism prevents us from 
following this path. Precisely because a single statement does not have its fund of 
experiential implications, we cannot separate the factual and the linguistic components 
of its truth. In Two Dogmas Quine develops this argument in an extreme form:
Taken collectively, science has its double dependence upon language ’ 
and experience; but this duality is not significantly traceable into the 
statements of science taken one by one. ... The unit of empirical 
significance is the whole of science.66
62 Quine writes: “Both Hempel and Philipp Franck subsequently brought Duhem to my attention, so I 
inserted the footnote when ‘Two Dogmas’ was reprinted in From a Logical Point o f View.” TDR, p. 
269.
63 OR, p. 79.
64 FLPV, p. 41.
65 In the first part of Two Dogmas Quine attacks the analytic-synthetic distinction adopting a different 
strategy (FLPV, pp. 20-37).
66 FLPV, p. 42.
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Hence holism is according to Quine at the root of the rejection of both dogmas of 
empiricism (and, in particular, of logical empiricism). His theory of meaning is still a 
verificationist one and holism is seen by Quine precisely as resulting from the only 
coherent development of verificationism.
The Vienna Circle espoused a verification theory of meaning but did 
not take it seriously enough.67
What kind of empiricism are we left with, when the two dogmas are abandoned in 
favour of a holistic conception of truth and meaning? Quine suggests that we should 
look at the whole of human knowledge as a field of force, whose boundary conditions 
are given by experience. All beliefs can be seen as placed at different distances from 
the periphery. Logic and mathematics will be right at the centre of the field and 
observational reports at the periphery. The conditions imposed by experience leave us 
great freedom in the choice of which of our beliefs to adjust when our expectations are 
disappointed by it. This leads to Quine’s famous conclusion:
Any statement can be held true come what may, if we make drastic 
enough adjustments elsewhere in the system. Even a statement very 
close to the periphery can be held true in the face of recalcitrant 
experience by pleading hallucination or by amending certain 
statements of the kind called logical laws. Conversely, by the same 
token, no statement is immune to revision.68
What in the metaphor is called the distance from the boundary of the field of force 
amounts in practice simply to our degree o f willingness to revise a certain statement in 
the event of infirming experience.69 We will not even consider, in general, changing a 
logical rule in order to save some of our ordinary beliefs; while beliefs about common- 
sense objects, for instance, tend to be revised very often just in response to ordinary
67 OR, p. 80. According to Quine his thesis on the indeterminacy of translation (see, for instance, WO, 
chapter II), is a consequence of the conjunction of Peirce’s and Duhem’s ideas (OR. pp. 80-81).
68 FLPV, p. 43.
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experiences. But also beliefs that are entrenched in our worldview can be revised under 
special conditions. Quine mentions two historical examples: the deviations from 
classical logic suggested for simplifying Quantum Mechanics and the intuitionistic 
rejection of the law of excluded middle in order to deal properly with the concept of 
infinite in mathematics. Both logic and mathematics are seen by Quine as constituted 
by hypotheses whose cognitive status is not different in principle from that of beliefs 
that are less general and intuitively more related to experience. Those hypotheses are 
part of the body of theory that is needed in order to imply anything observable.70 
Hence the duhemian freedom to choose which hypothesis to reject if a falsifying result 
is obtained extends, in principle, also to logic and mathematics.71
On the other hand even statements about ordinary observable events can in 
principle be held true come what may. Quine suggests two extreme strategies: pleading 
hallucination and changing the meaning of the words appearing in the statement. In 
practice “pleading hallucination” refers to the possibility of disqualifying an 
observational report when it conflicts with a well-established theory. It is not necessary 
for that purpose to turn the belief into disbelief, it is not necessary, for example, to 
convince ourselves that the water was not boiling when we were sure that it was in fact 
boiling. We can more modestly turn the belief into a non- belief.12 We settle for simply 
eschewing the belief from our knowledge and wait for further investigation. However, 
as we will see, the rejection of observation reports is something we should, according 
to Quine, rarely indulge in.
The expedient of changing the meaning of a word in order to save a theory looks at 
first sight far too paradoxical to be acceptable. But here again Quine is not really 
suggesting to trivially adopt this expedient in the everyday practice of science; he is 
simply clarifying the logical implications of his philosophy of language. Indeed there
69 As a matter of fact Quine’s notion of “distance from the periphery” has also a logical aspect. An 
ordinary observation report is logically linked to a smaller number of statements than a mathematical 
theorem.
70 In this way the problem that had beset the logical empiricists, and Carnap in particular, of explaining 
the meaningfulness of mathematics and logic (which seem devoid of factual content) is in Quine’s view 
resolved. Both mathematics and logic are meaningful for they are part of the system of beliefs that we 
use to describe and predict experience. Moreover the apparent necessity of their truth is due to the fact 
that they are the last beliefs we would normally decide to modify. This is in turn a consequence of the 
fact that any such modification produces a chain reaction that can affect large portions of our web of 
belief.
71 It should be stressed that by considering logical rules just as mere hypotheses assumed in the course 
of a derivation Quine runs into Lewis Carol’s problem.
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is a tension between semantic and epistemic holism. According to the latter it is 
possible to preserve a claim by revising other statements that jointly with it imply 
observational consequences that fail to be true; while according to the former such a 
move changes the very meaning of the claim we intend to save from refutation. The 
stratagem of changing the meaning of a word is then an extreme consequence of the 
interplay between semantic and epistemic holism.
If the constraints imposed by experience on our choice are so weak, what are the 
criteria that can guide us? Why should we decide to sacrifice a belief in order to save 
another belief? Quine’s answer lies in his empiricism:
As an empiricist I continue to think of the conceptual scheme of 
science as a tool, ultimately, for predicting future experience in the 
light of past experience.73
Our choice of hypotheses will be aimed at improving science as an instrument of 
prediction. At the end of the next section I will briefly outline Quine’s view on this 
issue.
2.2 A comparison between the Duhem Thesis and the Quine Thesis
Many commentators have compared the Duhemian and Quinean brands of holism on 
various grounds. I will here consider three aspects: 1) scope, 2) critical semantic mass, 
3) methodology.
Scope: the most striking contrast between the Duhem and the Quine Theses lies in the 
different extension of the part of knowledge that they concern. This has been noted by 
most critics, but without paying too much attention to the reasons for it.74 According to 
Duhem holism arises essentially in physics and up to a certain extent in sciences that 
have a similar logical structure, such as chemistry. There is no holism in sciences such
72 WB, chapter I.
73 FLPV, p. 44.
74 See, for instance, Krips, 1982; Ariew, 1984; Gochet, 1986, p. 29; Gillies, 1993.
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as anatomy of zoology. Although Duhem is not very explicit on this point, we could 
say that in his view holism manifests itself only in sciences that are based on 
mathematics and geometry and hence require acts of measurement for welding their 
language with the descriptions of ordinary facts. My reconstruction of the motivation 
for the Duhem Thesis is consistent with this interpretation. Holism is for Duhem a 
consequence of the structurally different status of physical knowledge with respect to 
common-sense one. The latter is exempted from holism because the typical judgement 
on which it is based provides a direct mirroring of the relations existing among 
individual instantiations of universals (we have heard this thunder after seeing the 
lightning; this man is mortal): experiments are theory-laden, observations are not.
Quine’s picture is very different: holism becomes a general theory of meaning. No 
sentence belonging to a language has meaning taken in isolation. There are no atomic 
expressions that correspond to given states of the affairs in the world; the very notion 
of state of affairs, or proposition that a sentence in isolation should mirror is rejected.75 
Even observation reports do not have a meaning by themselves in the intuitive sense of 
the term meaning 76 Common-sense knowledge is not exempt from quinean holism, 
nor are those sciences, such as zoology or botany that are (or we should say were at the 
time of Duhem) mainly based on common-sense observations. Indeed the crucial 
divergence between Duhem and Quine lies in their opposite views concerning the 
relationship between science and common-sense knowledge: Duhem would firmly 
reject Quine’s gradualism on this issue:
77Science is a continuation of common sense
We are working up our science from infancy onward.78
75 “This conclusion, ..., seals the fate of any general notion of propositional meaning or, for that matter, 
state of affairs.” OR, p.81. This does not mean that the notion of state of affairs by itself is rejected by 
Quine, who defends a radical version of physicalism (See Hookway, 1988, pp. 61-78, 212-216 and 
Gibson, 1982, pp. 161-166). The only real facts are according to Quine physical facts, but those facts 
cannot be put in correspondence to single statements belonging to the language of physics. My sentence 
"there are free electrons in a metal” does not have as meaning the fact that there are free electrons in a 
metal or a kind of fregean sense expressed by it. Simply it has no meaning by itself. When considered as 
a part of our system of beliefs it acquires cognitive significance insofar this system allows us to predict 
future experience in the light of past experience. To Quine’s holism there corresponds a disquotational 
theory of truth, according to which saying “there are free electrons in a metal is true” is really nothing 
more than saying that there are free electrons in a metal (see WO, section 6).
76 See below for further clarifications on this point.
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Contra Duhem, holism extends for Quine also to logic, mathematics and geometry. 
According to Duhem we have a direct, intuitive access to the truths of these 
disciplines. Quine, as we have seen, holds instead the view that they just provide part 
of the bundle of hypotheses that we need in order to predict anything about experience: 
there is no other evidence for their claims beyond the truth of the observable 
consequences they contribute to entail. Consequently mathematics, geometry and logic 
are revisable according to Quine, but unrevisable according to Duhem.
Critical Semantic Mass: this problem is related to the previous one. In Two Dogmas 
Quine exposes an extreme holism according to which “the unit of empirical 
significance is the whole of science”. Nearly all critics have rejected this conclusion. 
As a matter of fact we don’t need to involve all our beliefs in the implication of an 
observable consequence. Conversely the repercussions of a revision at the periphery of 
our web of belief are generally very limited. Already by the time he wrote his most 
influential book Word and Object, Quine had changed his mind on this point. 79 In 
1962 in a letter to Adolf Griinbaum he writes:
Actually my holism is not as extreme as those brief vague paragraphs 
at the end of “Two dogmas of empiricism” are bound to sound.80
In Two Dogmas in Retrospect Quine confesses to regret his old “needlessly strong 
statement of holism”.81 In general there are clusters of sentences that are large enough 
to imply observable effects or, in Quine’s terminology, large enough to have critical 
semantic mass*2 Therefore the units of empirical significance are smaller than the 
whole of science. However, this moderate conclusion should not make us forget that 
logic is shared by all parts of our knowledge. Therefore there are tensions that 
propagate through the whole web of belief. As I have already noticed, according to
77 FLPV, p. 45.
78 RR, p. 138.
79 WO, sections 1-3 and 7-10.
80 Published in Harding, 1976, p. 132.
81 TDR, p. 268.
82 In Two Dogmas in Retrospect Quine is very precise on the issue:"‘... a cluster of sentences has critical 
semantic mass if it implies an observation categorical” (TDR, p. 268). I will discuss in detail the concept 
of observation categorical in a later part of the thesis.
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Quine it is because a change in the logical rules has such widespread consequences 
that we tend to deem the propositions of logic necessarily true.
Many critics have focused on Quine’s first extreme formulation of holism and have 
contrasted it with the view resulting from the duhemian analysis of experimentation. 
Duhem seems to suggest that a large portion of physical theory is involved in 
performing an experiment and interpreting its results, not certainly the whole of 
physical theory. Most of it, along with all the rest of knowledge, remains outside the 
laboratory. This contrast is attenuated when Quine’s moderate holism is considered for 
comparison. At the end both Duhem and Quine would say that the “number” of 
hypotheses involved must be large enough and will vary from case to case.
Methodology, to focus narrowly on Two Dogmas can lead to the error of reading Quine 
as an extreme relativist who suggests to replace scientific methodology with an almost 
complete freedom of theorising. Donald Gillies, for instance, contrasts Duhem with 
Quine on the ground that the former offers a way out of the holistic impasse of theory 
choice with the already mentioned conception of scientific good sense, while the latter 
does not go beyond the logical point that experiment cannot compel us to accept or 
reject a hypothesis.83 However in a later work84 Quine does develop a sketchy theory 
of scientific methodology based on virtues “which count toward the plausibility of a 
hypothesis”.85 The five virtues are 1) conservatism, 2) generality, 3) simplicity, 4)
86 87refutability, 5) modesty. He then adds a sixth one, precision. In Gibson’s book on 
Quine and in an article by Krips88 Quine’s criteria for theory choice are discussed in 
some detail. I will here comment only on the importance of the first one, conservatism. 
In the revision of our beliefs motivated by recalcitrant (or simply by new) experience 
we have, according to Quine, to follow a maxim of minimal mutilation. This means 
that scientists should try to limit the damages to their pre-existing system of beliefs, 
especially when these are deemed very plausible.
83 Gillies, 1993, pp. 98-116.
84 WB, chapter V and VII.
85 Ibid. p. 42.
86 Ibid. p. 65.
87 Gibson, 1982, pp. 169-173.
88 Krips, 1982. For a succinct appraisal of Quine’s philosophy of science see also Smart’s article 
‘Quine’s Philosophy of Science” in Davidson and Hintikka, 1969.
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The plausibility of a hypothesis varies inversely with the plausibility 
of the prior beliefs that it disallows.89
I believe that the role of conservatism in Quine’s account of scientific method must be 
stressed, because it helps to defuse the seemingly paradoxical claims that are made in 
The Two Dogmas. According to Quine it would be anti-scientific or even irrational to 
conduct scientific research with the constant appeal to revolutionary and unheard-of 
theories in order to accommodate a new phenomenon or to save from refutation a 
cherished hypothesis.
In conclusion Quine makes at least an attempt to make explicit and as objective as 
possible the criteria for theory choice, contrary to Duhem, who limits himselif to a 
declaration of faith in the wisdom and intuition of researchers.90 Therefore, on this 
issue, Gillies’ picture is reversed.91
Let us now go back to the central theme of this thesis: the empirical basis of 
science.
89 WB, p. 44.
90 See Krips, 1982, pp. 258-263.
91 Quine’s attempt does not prevent him from thinking that some freedom is present in theory choice. He 
does not hope to find a set of rules that dictate the choice to be made in any circumstances. Whence his 
talk of virtues, not of rules.
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3. QUINE ON OBSERVATION
Introduction
In this chapter I will expose Quine’s views concerning observation. First of all I stress 
the vital need in his philosophy for a clarification of this concept. Quine’s solution 
comes through the naturalisation of the theory of knowledge. A naturalistic explicans 
for the intuitive notion of meaning of an observation sentence is provided by the 
concept of stimulus meaning. In the last section I give an account of how, in Quine’s 
view, his notion of observation sentence solves the problems related to the theory- 
ladenness of observation.
Although I suspect that Quine’s account of observation could be criticised in many 
respects, in this thesis I will not question it as far as common-sense knowledge is 
concerned.
3.1 The tension between Holism and Empiricism
As we have seen Quine's holism is not restricted to a part of our knowledge, namely 
physics, but it concerns the whole of our talk about the world. Such an extreme thesis 
demands that a clarification between holism, theory-ladenness and underdetermination 
be given. These three concepts are often vaguely associated when the credentials of 
observation and experiment as sources of reliable knowledge are put into question. 
However it will become clear from the following considerations that the possibility of
92their pacific coexistence is far from being obvious.
92 This difficulty is sensed also by Michael Dickson: “If observation is ‘theory-laden’, how can there be 
‘observationally equivalent theories’?” (Dickson, 1999, p. S47).
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There is certainly a line of reasoning that ties together a form of empiricism, and 
the doctrine of underdetermination. If we can identify a fundamental level of 
experience, that is if we can make sense of the notion of the given, then a first step is 
taken toward the idea that science is underdetermined by empirical evidence. A purely 
empirical level of description could be seen as a screen, which separates the domain of 
subjectivity from the external world. The latter would become an object of cognition 
only insofar it could manifest itself, directly or indirectly at the level of phenomena. 
The objects of the external world would project, so to speak, their shadows on the 
screen, and we would be left with nothing else, apart from those shadows, to 
understand the inner structure of reality. The metaphor is well suited to our purpose 
precisely because an infinite number of radically different objects can project exactly 
the same shadow. Any theory of the world that would enable us to predict the 
behaviour of the shadowy appearances could be seen as good as any other such theory. 
After all, one may try to argue, we could in principle know everything about the 
shadows and be dispensed with theory. We could, again in principle, accept the 
empirical content common to all empirically equivalent theories as the only real 
knowledge we can attain, and treat the theories as mere instruments of predictions.
This argument is one of the many that underlie Berkeley's denial of the existence 
of matter and his instrumentalist interpretation of Newton's physics.93 The metaphor 
can be used to illustrate also the more recent empiricist position resulting from having 
left behind the first and second of what Quine calls the five milestones of 
empiricism,94 that is after the shift from ideas to word and, in turn, from words to 
sentences. Instead of the shadows themselves we have now a purely observational 
language (such as a sense-datum language) in which it is possible to formulate the 
theory-free empirical content of scientific theories.
This last remark suggests that a traditional (although updated to the linguistic turn) 
empiricist account of scientific knowledge needs to overcome two difficulties in order 
to give a clear meaning to the doctrine of radical underdetermination (which in turn 
lends support to an instrumentalist conception of science): 1) to individuate a part of 
language which can be called observational; 2) to develop a notion of empirical 
content of scientific theory which can be tested directly against reports in observation
93 See Berkeley’s De Motu in Berkeley, 1980, and Popper, 1963, pp. 166-174.
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language, that is to clarify the relation between theory and observation. I will in the 
next two sections expose and analyse the way in which Quine meets the first challenge. 
Quine’s attempt to solve the second problem will be dealt with in the next chapter.
The quinean picture is from the outset very problematic, in that it allows the 
scientist to reject also the observational reports if he believes it needed. In the face of 
recalcitrant experience we can sometimes reject a statement close to the periphery in 
order to avoid a disruptive effect on the rest of our web of belief. This consequence of 
Quine's holism has prompted a severe criticism from Dummett, who sees no way to 
reconcile it with an empiricist view of knowledge. Moreover, argues Dummett, it is no 
longer clear in what sense we can speak of the periphery and the centre of the web of 
belief:
If alternative revisions are always possible, and, in particular, ones 
which leave the periphery intact, there is no content to saying that the 
total theory makes contact with experience only at the periphery.
Rather, the total theory confronts experience as a whole: as a whole, 
revision is or is not required in it by the occurrence of an experience; 
but there is not any one point or region in the total theory where the 
impact is made.95
To hold that an alternative revision that leaves the periphery intact is in principle 
always possible, means to say that even statements at the periphery do not have 
meaning in isolation, they are theory-laden in the sense that their acceptance or their 
rebuttal is dependent upon our overall theory of the world. In what sense then, asks 
Dummett, can we save empiricism and maintain that there is a periphery on which 
experience directly impinges? To go back to our metaphor there seem to be no screen 
and no shadows for nothing is really given in any sense. In some sense everything 
becomes theory.
In order to introduce Quine’s solution to these problems, let us start quoting a 
crucial passage from the article On Empirically Equivalent Systems o f the World.
94 TT, chapter 7.
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Now the Duhem thesis still holds in a somewhat literalistic way, even 
for these observation statements. For the scientist does occasionally 
revoke even an observation statement, when it conflicts with a well 
attested body of theories and when he has tried in vain to reproduce 
the experiment. But the Duhem thesis would be wrong if understood 
as imposing an equal status on all the statements in a scientific theory 
and thus denying the strong presumption in favor of the observation 
statements. It is this bias that makes science empirical96
There is therefore a methodological criterion that dictates as part of scientific 
rationality the bias in favour of observation sentences. However the preceding 
considerations suggest that what is needed is, first of all, a clear account of what 
observation statements are. How can they be demarcated from theoretical statements? 
To begin to answer to this question is necessary to recall the naturalistic behaviouristic 
conception of language and knowledge that informs all of Quine's thought.97
3.2 Quine on observation sentences
In the framework of Quine’s naturalistic-behaviouristic theory of knowledge the notion 
of experience as something given to the subject, something that we can describe in the 
first person, is rejected from the outset. Quine's surrogate for experience (I owe this 
expression to Hookway) is provided by the triggering of receptors at our nerves' 
endings. From the naturalistic point of view empiricism is not a thesis which can be 
established prior to science by means of a kind of first philosophy, it is a scientific 
hypothesis concerning how humans actually acquire information about their 
environment. And it is precisely science that tells us that the only way we get in touch 
with the world is via the stimulation of our nerves' endings. Empiricism is thus 
formulated as a thesis concerning man as a part of the objective reality which science 
investigates. Coherently enough Quine admits the possibility for future scientific
95 Dummett, 1973, p. 593. Quoted in Gochet, 1986, p. 31.
96 EESW, p. 314 (my emphasis).
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investigation to refute his empiricism, for it might be the case that men are found to be 
endowed with some kind of extra-sensorial perception. Paradoxical though it may 
seem, Quine's empiricism, being an empirical thesis, could be in principle refuted by 
experience. However, as we shall see in the next chapter, there are other, I would say 
more serious problems that beset Quine's empiricism from within his philosophy.
Once we accept to ask science for an account of what science itself is, we can, 
according to Quine, say that
... science is a conceptual bridge of our own making, linking sensory 
stimulation to sensory stimulation; there is no extrasensory
98perception.
This insight is also the starting point for any acceptable theory of meaning," a theory 
that must be based upon a coherent empirical semantics. We must investigate language 
analysing the behaviour of speakers under the presence of verbal and non-verbal 
stimulation.
For this purpose Quine divides all sentences into two main categories: standing 
sentences and occasion sentences. Occasion sentences are sentences true in some 
occasions and false in others that prompt the assent of a competent speaker in the 
presence of the appropriate range of stimulation (for example, "It's raining", "There is 
a rabbit", "This is blue", but also "This is a bachelor"). Standing sentences are 
sentences that can be assented to also in the absence of the appropriate kind of 
stimulation that motivated the original assent (for example: "the Times has come"). 
Among them there is the important subclass of the eternal sentences, which are true or 
false for all members of a speech community at any time, independently of the 
stimulatory conditions (obvious example "2 + 2 = 4", but also "It rains in London on 
the 10th of October 2000"). Among the occasion sentences we must further distinguish 
between two subgroups: the set of obser\?ation sentences and its complement, that we 
might call the set of non-observational occasion sentences.
97 The logically fundamental role of the naturalistic-behaviouristic conception of knowledge and 
language in Quine’s philosophy is stressed by R. F. Gibson. See Gibson, 1982, pp. XIX, 62, 63-65, 173.
98 TT, p. 2.
99 Quine believes that as to the theory of linguistic meaning "one has no choice but to be an empiricist”, 
OR, p. 81.
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Let us now focus on observation sentences. For a given speaker there is a difference 
in degree in the amount of collateral information that is needed beyond the presence of 
the appropriate stimulation to assent to a certain statement. In order to say "this man is 
a bachelor", I must have gathered some information about his past. Indeed the range of 
stimulation associated with the presence of that man in my surroundings is by no 
means sufficient to prompt the assent to the sentence in question. Another competent 
speaker may lack of the relevant information necessary for it. As a matter of fact some 
stored information will be required for assenting to any sentence, for the speaker will 
have to able at least to remember the words that compose them. Consequently Quine 
defines the observation sentences, as those occasion sentences that can be assented to 
without any collateral information beyond what is required to the recognition of the 
linguistic expression itself.100 Hence an observation sentence will be assented to by 
any member of a given speech community in the relevant stimulatory situations. 
Moreover, the occasion of utterance must be intersubjective: "I am in pain" cannot 
count as an observation sentence, for, as it fails to be related to a range of external 
stimulations, the occasion that prompts assent to it cannot be public. In short an 
observation sentence is defined as
an occasion sentence whose occasion is not only intersubjectively 
observable but is generally adequate, moreover, to elicit assent to the 
sentence from any present witness conversant with the language.101
Observation sentences are according to Quine the repository of empirical knowledge 
and play a key role in the construction of the edifice of science. In defining the notion 
of observation sentence I have earlier referred to their relation with the triggering of 
receptors. How is this relation to be understood more precisely? Quine introduces the 
notion of stimulus meaning'.
The range of stimulations associated with an observation sentence, 
affirmatively or negatively, I call its affirmative or negative stimulus 
meaning for the given speaker.102
100 OR, p. 86.
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This definition links any observation sentence to a class of physical events occurring in 
the external world. Indeed if the intuitive idea of observation sentence was that of a 
sentence closely related to perception, we can appreciate how Quine's definition gives 
a suitable explicans of it in naturalistic, behaviouristic terms: as a matter of fact some 
bits of our language are closely related to the triggering of our receptors.
The problem of relating theory to sensory stimulation may now be put 
less forbiddingly as that of relating theory formulations to observation 
sentences.103
How can we in practice identify the class of observation sentences? Quine' gives 
two answers to this question. In vague terms the identification can be made on 
behavioural ground, by studying the linguistic reactions of a given speech community 
under appropriate stimulations. The reference to the whole community is here crucial, 
for it is well known that members of some groups of specialists share such a rich 
storage of background knowledge, that they can assent, under the appropriate 
conditions, to many occasion sentences most of speakers would not even be able to 
understand. What would be classified as observational for a group of trained 
experimental physicists would be considered by most of people as highly theoretical: 
Duhem already pointed it out very clearly. The behavioural criterion prescribes that the 
matter be settled by taking as paradigmatic the linguistic responses of the untrained 
observer for
Specialists rest content with the level of evidence that commands their 
expert agreement, but in principle they usually could reduce this 
recondite evidence to observation terms at the layman's level.104
101 NNK, p. 73.
102 PT p. 3. For a more detailed definition of stimulus meaning, involving also the duration of the 
stimulation, see WO, section 8.
103 TT, p. 25.
104 EESW p. 316-317.
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Let us note how much here Quine is echoing Duhem's reference to the layman's 
language. The behavioural criterion for identifying the observation sentences has 
however two major shortcomings.
1) We would like to rank as observational those statements that belong to speakers 
trained to recognise particular smells, tastes and sounds, such as chemists, wine tasters 
and musicians, and that are certainly not translatable into common-sense language.
2) In general even the simplest observation terms have a certain kind of vagueness that 
can make agreement between speakers difficult and inconstant.
In order to overcome these weaknesses of the behavioural criterion Quine proposes to 
individuate the observation sentences as those that can be learned ostensively105 (there 
is no necessity that each single speaker has actually learned them all by ostention).106
3.3 Observation sentences and Holism
The notion of observation sentence has been now clarified enough to see how it is used 
by Quine in order to provide an account of the empirical basis of science. Thanks to it 
we can avoid direct reference to the triggering of receptors and talk instead of the 
relation between theory and observation sentences. Holism can be phrased as the thesis 
that a statement taken in isolation has no separate fund of confirmatory of 
disconfirmatory experiences. Quine's empirical semantics provides a surrogate for such 
fund of experience with the notion of stimulus meaning fo r the observation sentences. 
As I have said, what is wanting for an explanation is how Quine can consistently 
maintain his version of holism and commit himself to empiricism. The first step 
toward this explanation has been taken. Yet many problems still have to be solved. 
Have we found a bedrock of sentences that can be equated with Duhem's brute facts? 
Certainly not. Although Quine has defined in a clear way the observation sentences, 
and has somehow managed to give them a special status in virtue of the notion of
105EESW p. 316.
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stimulus meaning, the problem of their theory-ladennes seems still to be tackled. How 
can we make intelligible the bias in favour of observation sentences that renders 
science empirical? Let us see Quine’s solution to the problem.
My definition distinguishes observation sentences from others, 
whether relative to a special community or to the general one, without 
reference to theory-freedom. There is a sense, as we shall now see, in 
which they are all theory-laden, even the most primitive ones, and 
there is a sense in which none are, even the most professional ones.107
In order to clarify this passage it is necessary to briefly recall Quine's theory of 
language acquisition. The first expressions that a child learns are simple words such as 
"mamma" or "water". They are learned ostensively and through normal mechanisms of 
imitation and reinforcement. These words, along with simple sequences of words such 
as "dad is here" are learnt as undivided wholes or, in technical terms holophrastically. 
The child does not strictly speaking learn any word; he learns only whole sentences by 
becoming accustomed to the stimulatory condition under which they should be uttered. 
"Water", at this stage, is a sentence just as much as "dad is here". The ostensive 
learning leads inevitably to a kind of conditioning of the linguistic behaviour, for 
which the sentence is simply associated to a range of stimulations. Only much later 
will the child acquire the ability to master the language in its full complexity. Only at 
that time will the child be able to analyse word by word the sentences that he has 
learned holophrastically.
It is clear that the first sentences learned are in general observation sentences, 
while the theoretical sentences, loosely related to the sensory stimulations, are 
mastered at a later stage. The crucial point is that observation sentences, seen 
holophrastically, are theory-free, as they are assented to or denied, somehow 
mechanically in the presence of the relevant conditions. We don't need to think or to 
recall any kind of auxiliary information in order to say "it is raining" while walking out 
of the door. We utter that sentence because we have been conditioned to associate it to 
a certain pattern of stimulation. However the words that go into the observation
106 Further qualifications on the concept of observation sentence are added by Quine in TI, pp. 1-4.
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sentences appear also in the theoretical ones. It is this sharing of words that makes 
possible the logical connection between observation and theoretical sentences, and 
these logical connections are responsible for the holistic character of language and 
knowledge. Their effect is twofold: on one side they make observation relevant for 
theoretical language, (speaking with licence, they let empirical meaning edge itself 
through observation into theory); on the other side they inevitably load observation 
sentences with a theoretical burden. To illustrate this point let us consider the simple 
statement "this is water". The term “water" appearing in it is also to be found in a 
statement such as "water is H2 O". Therefore whereas the holophrastic expression 
"water" was simply a non-committal linguistic reaction to certain stimulations, the 
same expression seen word by word becomes extremely theory-laden. For the speaker 
by saying "this is water" can be led to saying "this is H2 O", which is an expression that 
underlies a great deal of physical and chemical theory and that is connected to a 
virtually infinite set of possible confirming or disconfirming experiences (imagine all 
possible tests aimed at finding out whether a liquid is water). I would say that by 
"becoming" theory-laden the statement has lost its direct connection to the original 
stimulus meaning, it falls prey to the lack of a separate fund of relating experiences 
that affect almost all sentences.1081 believe that Quine is hinting at the possibility that 
the speaker might revoke his early observation sentence as a consequence of careful 
chemical analyses, hence as a consequence of stimulations that have nothing to do with 
the stimulus meaning of the sentence "this is water".
The conclusion is that given an observation sentence
Seen holophrastically, as conditioned to stimulatory situations, the 
sentence is theory-free; seen analytically, word by word, it is theory­
laden.109
Note that this is true for any object whatsoever to which a term in an observation 
sentence may refer. The example just mentioned involved a term like water, that is in
107 PT, p. 7.
10x Here we can appreciate that for Quine theory and language are inseparably intertwined.
109 PT p. 7. Gochet refers to this solution as following from his own reading of Quine (Gochet, 1986, p. 
33). However already by the time Gochet published his book, Quine had been very clear on this issue 
(see for instance TT p. 30).
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clear relationship with scientific theory; but the same considerations would apply to 
terms such as "table" or "hand". Any posit is by itself theoretical.110 Ontology does not 
appear at all at the level of holophrastic expressions. Quine makes clear in several 
writings that the full shift from holophrastic expressions to the appreciation of their 
term by term structure requires a complex apparatus of prediction that leads to 
objective reference through quantification.111 Any talk about objects requires the full 
development of the theoretical part of language. The holophrastic expression "there is 
water" does not by itself commit the speaker uttering it to any particular kind of 
ontology.
Quine individuates three advantages of his definition of observation sentence:
1) as their link with theory is given simply by the sharing of vocabulary, there is no 
need to postulate bridge principles a la Reichenbach in order to connect observations 
with theory.
2) The definition itself of observation sentence has nothing to do with its being theory­
laden or theory-free. Hence most of the debate sprung among neopositivists on the so- 
called "protocol sentences" and their relation with experience and theory112 is side­
stepped.
3) We can investigate the acquisition and the use of observation sentences "without 
prejudging what objects, if any, the component words are meant to refer to"113 whereas 
"Taking terms as starting point would have meant finessing reification and conceding 
objective reference out of hand, without considering what it is for and what goes into
110 It should be recalled that according to Quine “to call a posit a posit is not to patronise it” (WO, p. 22) 
Any entity is a posit from the point of view of naturalistic epistemology, that studies how we develop 
our theoretical talk as a response to the sensory input. From the point of view of the related theory a 
posit is real.
111 See, for instance, OR, pp. 1-25 and WO, chapter 3.
112 For an account of the debate on protocol sentences between Schlick, Carnap and Neurath, see 
Hanfling, 1981. Some of the original articles can be found in Ayer, 1959.
113 PT, p. 8.
114 PT, p. 8-9.
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In conclusion, Quine develops a notion of observation sentence aimed at dissolving 
the tension between his commitment to both empiricism and all-embracing (although 
moderate) holism as far as the concept o f observation is concerned. We can now take 
a step forward and see how he tries to give, within his theoretical framework, an 
account of the empirical basis of physical theories, of the concept of empirical content 
and of the thesis of underdetermination of theories by empirical evidence. We will see 
that it is precisely in relation with these issues that Quine’s empiricism shows its 
weaknesses.
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4. QUINE ON THE RELATION BEWEEN OBSERVATION AND 
SCIENTIFIC THEORY: EXPOSITION AND CRITICISM
Introduction
The first four sections of this chapter deal mainly with the concept of empirical content 
of theories. 1 will first of all comment on the importance of this concept especially in 
relation with the problem of underdetermination. The difference between Quine’s and 
van Fraassen’s treatments of the latter will be underlined.
Quine has developed two different accounts of the concept of empirical content. He 
has first tried to specify it by means of the notion of observation conditional. This 
attempt is dealt with in sections 4.1 and 4.1.1. The intuitive idea behind it is roughly 
that it would be possible in principle to describe all the observable events of the history 
of the universe and then ask scientists to formulate theories that encompass such 
description in a finite formulation. Problems related mainly to the unavoidably 
theoretical character of the specification of space and time led Quine to a different 
strategy for defining the empirical content of theories, which is based on the concept of 
observation categorical. In section 4.2.1 I will criticise this strategy.
In general Quine’s view concerning the role of observation in experiments and its 
relation with theory will be the object of many objections. I will argue that it is 
impossible to individuate a purely empirical content of a theory. In the last two sections 
I will deal with two criticisms that may be brought against the point of view defended in 
this chapter.
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4.1 Quine on empirical content, empirical equivalence and underdetermination
The first time Quine deals systematically with the issue of underdetermination is in the 
famous article On Empirically Equivalent Systems o f the World, in which many 
important claims concerning empirical content and empirical equivalence are stated 
very clearly.
After distinguishing holism from the thesis of underdetermination, Quine maintains 
that the former lends credence to the latter. We have already underlined this fact. 
However Quine is aware that holism by itself does not logically guarantee that the 
thesis of underdetermination is correct. Furthermore the latter is simply not very clear. 
The main purpose of the article lies in the attempt to define precisely the notion of 
underdetermination and then to assess its plausibility.
It is time now to stress the difference between two notions of underdetermination, 
local and global,115 When we say that two theories are underdetermined by empirical 
evidence, do we mean that the evidence so far available is not enough for settling 
which of the two theory is true (local underdetermination) or do we mean that the 
indecision would survive all possible evidence that we could even in principle gather 
(global underdetermination)? It is clear that two theories can be locally 
underdetermined even if they are not globally underdetermined. Perhaps the presence 
of new auxiliary assumptions may extend the range of the observable consequences of 
the two theories and may lead to an experiment that settles which one of the two, if 
any, is really empirically adequate. This and other similar arguments have motivated 
Laudan's and Leplin's116 claim that underdetermination, being relative to a particular 
state of science, is never absolute and always refutable. However, as is stressed by 
Hoefer and Rosenberg, their arguments would not apply if a global theory or system of 
the world were at hand. In that case the presence of a rival underdetermined theory 
could not be dealt with by looking for new possible crucial experiments. Therefore, 
they conclude, if we want to take seriously the issue of underdetermination, we will 
have to discuss it as applied to global rival theories, for or against which no further 
decisive experience can be conceived.
115 See, for similar considerations, Hoefer and Rosenberg, 1994, pp. 592-593.
116 Laudan and Leplin, 1991.
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I believe that a similar train of thought must have motivated Quine's choice in his 
article to treat the problem of underdetermination as a problem concerning alternative 
systems of the world. In this way we separate the practical issue of having to look for 
new experimental results in order to opt for one of many rival theories, from the 
logico-epistemological issue of whether observations are by themselves enough to fix 
the content of our theories. In practice, as Quine says,117 there is a trivial sense in 
which all theories are underdetermined by past observations, for future ones may 
always surprise us somehow, and even by all past and future observations that have 
been or will be carried out, for many other observable events may simply go 
unnoticed.
Let us now get back to the problem of making sense of underdetermination. First 
of all we need to find a way to relate theories to empirical evidence. Intuitively we 
might think that a theory is empirically adequate if it is confirmed by all true 
observation sentences. However there is no way to make a theory imply an observation 
sentence, for a theory can be seen as a conjunction of standing (even eternal) 
sentences, while an observation sentence is an occasion sentence, true in some cases, 
false in others. Quine attempts to solve this problem by introducing the notion of 
pegged observation sentence. If we choose an arbitrary system of co-ordinates we can 
then associate each observation sentence expressible in our language to each 
combination of spatio-temporal co-ordinates. In this way we obtain a set of standing
1 1 o
sentences, some true and some false; these are the pegged observation sentences. 
The subset of the true ones can be considered as the description of all observable 
events of the history of the universe, whether observed by man or not. In The Nature o f 
Natural Knowledge Quine adopts, in order to describe the situation, the vivid image of 
an observational oracle
... capable of assigning a truth value to every standing observational 
report expressible in our language.119
117 RIT, p. 178.
1181 would say that some combinations of co-ordinate would correspond to places at which it is physically 
impossible to use our sense-organs (such as the centre of the sun!). This is not the main problem however.
119 NNK p. 79.
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According to Quine these pegged observation sentences can be deduced by a theory in 
conjunction with other pegged observation sentences that describe the initial 
conditions. The resulting sentence is called by Quine an observation conditional. A 
theory implies observation conditionals. An empirically adequate global theory is one 
that implies all true observation conditionals. In general "The class of observation 
conditionals implied by a theory formulation is said to comprise the empirical content 
o f a theory"120. Consequently two theories are empirically equivalent when they imply 
the same observation conditionals.
It is, I believe, very important to explain why what we are after is specifying the 
empirical content of scientific theories. As I have already pointed out this notion is 
needed in order to identify the common observational ground that many 
underdermined theories may share. The importance of this analysis can be highlighted 
by contrasting it with the way underdetermination is usually discussed.
A standard example of underdetermination has been put forward by van Fraassen in 
his book The Scientific Image.121 Let NT stand for Newtonian theory (i.e. Newton's 
mechanics plus the theory of gravitation) and R be the further hypothesis that the 
centre of gravity of the Solar System is at rest with respect to absolute space. Let 
instead be V the hypothesis that the centre of gravity of the Solar System has absolute 
constant velocity v. We can now formulate two empirically equivalent theories by 
considering the conjunctions NT & R and NT & V. Indeed by changing the value of v 
we can formulate an infinity of empirically equivalent theories i.e. an infinity of 
theories that are underdetermined by empirical evidence and yet logically 
incompatible, for they make contradictory claims on the absolute velocity of the centre 
of gravity of the Solar System.
What I want to stress is that this example, while suggesting the plausibility in 
principle of the thesis of underdetermination, is of very little help in understanding its 
real scope. After all the theories just considered differ very little in what they say about 
the world. If we were indecisive about which one of them we should adopt, our 
overall set of beliefs about the universe would be fairly stabilised. There would be little 
room left for doubt and indecision. As a matter of fact, those variants of the Newtonian
120 Gibson, 1982, p. 86.
121 Van Fraassen. 1980, chapter three. See also van Fraassen, 1976.
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theory share one and the same ontology, for the all posit masses, forces, energy, 
momentum and even absolute space and time. Moreover they rely on the same laws 
and principles and, in virtue of their unanimous acceptance of concepts such as inertial 
frame, inertial forces etc..., they dictate the same strategies for carrying out 
measurements about the observable motions. All of them would teach us, for instance, 
that in order to improve our determination of the orbit of a planet we have to take into 
account several corrections due to to the complex motion of the Earth. Even the most 
theory-laden experimental results would be treated by those theories in the same way. 
In conclusion, we can say that in this example we deal with theories that, so to speak, 
branch away from the same trunk only at the top of the trunk. It would be clearly 
inappropriate to say that what they share is something we can interpret as a purely 
empirical content; for they share complicated and theory-dependent claims that are by 
no means uncontroversial. Duhem's analysis of the theory dependence of the use of 
symbols and approximations should suffice to convince of this (see section 1.2). Van 
Fraassen does speak about the empirical content of theories, or about the appearances 
that theory must save, but he is explicit in considering them as completely theory­
laden. When he upholds the motto “to save the phenomena” he must be subscribing to 
a view similar to the one I exposed in section 1.6.1.122
However if we want to understand what the real scope and significance of 
underdetermination can be, we must investigate whether different theories are possible 
that differ much more radically. Maybe it is possible to eschew reference to forces and 
masses, maybe it is possible to develop a complicated variant of a geocentric system 
of the world, maybe there are other expressions of the law of gravity that could work 
as well, provided that we modify in some way the principles of dynamics themselves; 
or, again, we may try to reform the theories that allow us to measure the movement of 
celestial bodies, such as optics. In short, the question is: can the branching occur at a 
more fundamental level of description? What would be, in this case, the evidential
122 See van Fraassen, 1980, pp. 44-47. The fact that according to van Fraassen it is necessary to 
distinguish between observational and non-observational parts of a theory does not conflict with this 
interpretation of his notion of empirical content. According to van Fraassen the belief in the existence of, 
say, electrons and protons should be sharply distinguished from the belief in the existence of observable 
objects such as planets and stars. Nevertheless what he calls the empirical content of a theory does not 
simply amount to a set of claims that can be tested through unaided vision as it results clear from his 
treatment of Newton’s theory.
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ground that the various imcompatible theories would share? And most of all, is there a 
really fundamental level of descriptions at which the possibility in principle of the 
branching first arises?
The definition of empirical content just illustrated is designed to solve these 
problems. Quine, just like Duhem and van Fraassen, believes that the aim of science is 
to save the phenomena,123 but according to him the phenomena consist simply in the 
stimulations of our nerves’ endings. Therefore it is at a level as close as possible to the 
sensory stimulations that he tries to locate the purely empirical content of scientific 
theories. However, as I will argue, there are many serious objections to the 
meaningfulness of Quine’s solution.
Having defined the concept of empirical content, Quine goes on to deal with the 
problem of underdetermination. I will skip the details of this discussion,124 in order to 
focus on what is relevant for clarifying the relationship between theory and 
observation. Quine summarises his discussion in this way
... the thesis of under-determination would assert merely that our 
system of the world is bound to have empirically equivalent 
alternatives which, if we were to discover them, we would see no way 
of reconciling by reconstrual of predicates. This vague and modest 
thesis I do believe.125
The consequences of this thesis are judged by Quine “vitally important to one’s 
attitude toward science”126. What stance would we take toward our knowledge, if we 
were confronted with two logically incompatible systems of the world, that resist 
reduction to one another by reconstrual of predicates? Quine himself has, in various 
writings, oscillated between two opposite views on the matter, that he has 
subsequentely named the sectarian view and the ecumenical view. According to the 
sectarian view we are committed to believe true our system of the world and false the 
other. It would be impossible to step outside of the arena and contemplate both
123 The Pursuit of Truth begins with Plato’s famous dictum ocbCav xa cpaivopsva.
124 A synthetic exposition of the article EESW can be found in Gibson, 1982, pp. 84-90.
125 EESW, p. 327.
126 ,
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127systems. Viceversa, according to the ecumenical view, we must give up our 
“illusion of there being only a solution to the riddle of the universe”128, and accept the 
possibility of having to describe the world alternatively within one system or the other, 
“using distinctive signs to indicate which game we are playing”129.
The dilemma between these two views has prompted a huge debate over the 
internal consistency of Quine’s philosophy. The coherence of its simultaneous 
commitment to empiricim and naturalism has been called into question.130 As will be 
clear in the remaining part of the thesis I indend to concentrate on the presuppositions 
shared by those who take part in the debate, regardless of the side they take.
Let us first of all appreciate how much Quine’s treatment of underdetermination 
differs from van Fraassen’s. In this case what is considered is the alternative between 
two incompatible systems of the world that share solely a common fund of observation 
conditionals. The effort is to contemplate the possibility of rival systems that differ 
wildly as to any theoretical aspect, that is as to anything that goes beyond the scope of 
observation sentences intended holophrastically,131 I use the word “effort”, for Quine 
intends to describe this possibility by means of the notion of empirical content, and I 
will argue below that this cannot be done. However, compared to van Fraassen’s 
treatment, underdetermination has already now assumed a much more dramatic aspect. 
And, not surprisingly, the radicality of Quine’s version of underdetermination is 
accompanied by a no less radical empiricist faith. Indeed in many passages of EESW, 
Quine shows a strong tendency toward the idea that theory is only practically 
necessary, for science, but in principle superfluous. It seems really to find in Quine’s 
thought an echo of the old-fashioned empiricist positions that I mentioned earlier. 
Again the possibility of radical underdetermination raises the temptation to stick to the 
empirical content of a theory and jettison all the “trumped-up matter, or stuffing [sic], 
whose only service is to round out the formulation”132. Often Quine’s maintains that 
this elimination of theory is impossible for practical or contingent reasons. A detailed
12/ TT, pp. 21-22.
128 NNK, p. 81.
129 EESW, p. 328.
130 See Gibson, 1986, Genova, 1988, Gibson, 1991. On the tension between realism and Quine’s 
doctrine of underdetermination, see Bergstrom, 1984, 1990, and 1993.
131 If two theories are in complete disagreement about ontology, but are supported by the same set of 
observation sentences, then it follows that these have to be considered as pre-ontological.
132 EESW, p. 324.
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criticism of the notion of empirical content can show that, on the contrary, observation 
is irrelevant in science without theory. A different account of empirical equivalence 
and underdetermination will be therefore necessary.
4.1.1 Some objections to Quine’s first notion of empirical content
The first difficulty is related to the obvious fact that theories cannot imply observation 
sentences. The solution, as we have seen, is to turn to the pegged observation 
sentences. However this is no innocent move. The process of establishing a reference 
frame is extremely theory-dependent. In practice we will need to choose some objects 
or phenomena and an instant of time as origin of the system of co-ordinates. But in 
order to do this we need to commit ourselves to a particular ontology. It is clear from 
the outset that the pegged observation sentences cannot be intended as holophrastic 
expression, in the first place because they are not occasion sentences. They have a term 
by term structure at least insofar they make reference to the origin of the system of co­
ordinates. This means that their formulation requires that reification and ontology have 
already slipped into the picture. Different theories implying the same observation 
conditionals may differ wildly in what they mean by "water", but they must agree on 
the individuation, that is on the identity of the object taken as origin of the frame of 
reference.133 Besides, they must all share some mathematics and geometry and imply 
techniques aimed at determining space and time intervals that lead to equal results at 
any level of approximation. For if there were among two theories even a small 
discrepancy in the determination of such intervals, we could no longer say that they 
imply the same pegged observation sentences. But the worst is yet to come, for the 
mere assumption that there is a global co-ordinate system would rule out a class of 
models of the theory of General Relativity! Problems arise already at the level of 
Special Relativity according to which there is no matter of fact about which of two 
events separated by a space-like interval happens first. Suppose that one system of the 
world is based on a classical notion of space-time and another on the theory of Special 
Relativity; then a change of co-ordinates to a uniformly shifting inertial system would
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be completely harmless for the first theory, but would imply a different spatio- 
temporal ordering of events according to the second.
That Quine sensed at least part of these difficulties can be understood by this 
remark:
Our move from occasional observation sentences to these pegged 
observation sentences is already an abrupt ascent from observation into 
theory. We need to know not only a bit of mathematics but also quite a 
lot about the physical world in order to establish a system of co­
ordinates. I shall suppose this much achieved, in order to get on better 
with further questions; but let us not lose sight of the magnitude of our 
assumptions. The doctrine of under-determination says there is a certain 
slack between observation and theory; and we have already lost some of 
that slack by granting the system of co-ordinates. Just in order to define 
the slack, we are having to take some of it up.134
4.2 Quine’s second thought on the notion of empirical content
It is Quine's awareness of these problems that explains, in my view, why in later 
writings his account of the relationship between theory and observation is different. In 
Theories and Things he considers another problem related to the concept of 
observation conditional.135 When a scientist tries to verify the truth of an observation 
conditional, he faces the problem that the antecedent conditions constituting the 
premise of the conditional may have occurred at a place-time which is "at some 
remove" from that at which those constituting the consequent of the conditional should 
take place. The scientist cannot be sure that the facts described in the antecedent really 
took place, for his senses cannot in that moment attest it to him. He will have to rely on 
indirect evidence in order to infer that the premise of the conditional has been fulfilled. 
This evidence will usually comprise memory, written records and the testimony of
133 As it is well known, according to Quine the individuation of objects is a major theoretical step that is 
taken within a language-theoiy of the world.
134 EESW, p. 317.
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others. Again this may seem an innocent objection. Why is Quine so keen on pointing 
it out? The reason is that any kind of inference depending on indirect evidence is based 
on some theory, primitive and unquestioned though it may be. The experimenter must 
assume that his memory or his assistants are reliable and that the records contain 
faithful description of the facts. As I have already pointed out, what Quine is trying to 
identify here is a level of pure observation, which is used to test theories. In order to 
achieve this he must distil what is nothing but direct experience expressible in 
observation sentences from the network of theoretical assumptions that surround any 
utterance. If he allows the act of observation to include the reliance on some theory his 
aim will not be entirely achieved.
Clearly, then, our observation conditions were too liberal. We should 
limit our attention to conditional sentences "if A then B" where A and 
B stand for eternalized observation sentences referring to one and the 
same place-time.136
In this way Quine believes that the experimenter can see before him all that is needed 
to test a prediction of a theory. I don’t find this solution convincing. An experiment in 
physics can involve the simultaneous check of such a tremendous amount of 
experimental conditions, that there is no way for a single person to carry it out. 
Whether the antecedent and the consequent of a conditional refer to the same or to 
different place-time the reliance on memory and most of all on testimony is 
unavoidable. Is it possible to imagine a verification at the CERN of a prediction based 
on the standard model carried out without the recourse to testimony? I think we should 
conclude that an observation carried out during an experiment differs from ordinary 
observation in that the former is always interrelated with testimony and memory in a 
way that the latter needs not be. We can perhaps be just a bit more daring and suggest 
that in an experiment (at least in one of some complexity) the concept of observation 
should be construed as referring to a collective activity. Or else, if we were to stick to
135 TT, p. 26-27.
136 TT, p. 27.
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Quine's strict concept of observation, we should say that when a theory is tested 
observation must always be supplemented by testimony.137
Let us now get back to Quine's attempt to solve the problem of having to specify a 
system of co-ordinates for the observational basis of science. As both clauses of 
observation conditionals are now required to refer to the same place-time, it is possible 
to drop altogether the mention of space and time and turn to what Quine calls 
observation categoricals. Observation categoricals are eternal sentences formed by the 
conjunction of observation sentences such as "When there is smoke, there is fire"; 
"when the sun rises, the birds sing"; "when lightning, thunder". Their common 
structure is the following: "Whenever this, that". They generalise over places and time 
without reference to any system of co-ordinates and hence to any ontology of space 
and time. With this notion Quine believes he has solved the problem of relating theory 
to observation, for, although the observation categoricals are general statements, he 
maintains that they can be tested by anyone without further theoretical assumptions. 
Quine draws a this point the following conclusions:
1) In order to test an observation categorical an experimenter need not rely on memory 
or in any kind of testimony.
2) Observation is now disentangled from theory, for "Specifications of place-times 
are still indispensable to science, but we have kicked them upstairs: we have consigned 
them to the network of theoretical concepts where they belong, at a comfortable 
remove from observation"138.
3) In order to test a theory it suffices to derive from it (of course in conjunction with 
some auxiliary hypotheses) an observation categorical. This being a compound of 
observation sentences, the experimenter will simply need to be in the stimulatory 
situation in which he will be ready to assent to the first clause of the observation
137 The theory-dependence of the reliance on testimony is stressed by Quine and Ullian in The Web of 
Belief, chapter IV, where the relation between testimony and observation is equated to that between the 
latter and the use of instruments such as telescopes, radar, and microscopes (whose reliability is based 
on physical theory). Both testimony and the use of such instruments are called by the authors "in a 
certain figure of speech" vicarious obser\>ation (WB, p. 34).
138 TT, p. 28.
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categorical and to affirm or deny the second clause. Thus the observation categorical 
"When the sun rises, the birds sing" is refuted by observing the sun rising and noticing 
that the birds are silent.
4) The empirical content of a theory is the set of observation categoricals that it 
implies (hence we have a new definition of empirical content139). Consequently two 
theories implying the same observation categoricals are said empirically equivalent.
4.2.1 A criticism of Quine’s second thought on the notion of empirical content
I have already argued that claim 1) is not convincing. I will now discuss the validity of 
claims 2), 3), 4). To start with it will be advisable to consider an example taken from 
science proper, for all instances of observation categoricals thus mentioned have very 
little to do with the prediction of, say, physical theory (and I cannot quite get myself to 
accept, as Quine does, that there is no difference in principle between the muttering of 
a child and a scientific observational report). The only "decent" example of experiment 
that, at least to my knowledge, Quine has discussed is to be found in the Pursuit o f 
Truth.
Let us suppose that a group of mineralogists have identified a new crystalline 
mineral of pinkish colour and have called it Utholite. Subsequently a member of the 
group puts forward a conjecture about the chemical structure of the mineral. This 
conjecture, together with a well-confirmed body of theories, implies that any specimen 
of litholite will emit hydrogen sulphide when heated above 180°. Quine concludes:
These last provisions are the observables; for our mineralogist and his 
colleagues know litholite when they see it and hydrogen sulfide when 
they smell it, and they can read a thermometer.
The test of a hypothesis thus hinges on a logical relation of 
implication. On one side, the theoretical, we have the backlog of 
accepted theory plus the hypothesis. This combination does the
139 In later writings the notion of observation conditional is abandoned. See in PT the footnote at p. 10, 
where it is defined "a less fruitful notion".
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implying. On the other side, the observational, we have an implied 
generality that the experimenter can directly test, directly challenge - 
in this case by heating some of the pink stuff and sniffing.140
The generality referred to should be, precisely, an observation categorical. But how are 
we to formulate it? Quine is not explicit on this point. However one might suggest that 
the observation categorical tested in this experiment is
(1) Whenever* the temperature reaches 180°, litholite smells in such a such way141
Now, it is easy to see that (1) cannot be an observation categorical, for its first clause 
is not at all an observation sentence. We can’t utter values of temperature simply in the 
presence of some stimulatory conditions: sentences about a physical magnitude cannot 
be learned ostensively. Sentence (1) can be considered as a theoretical generalisation, 
which is corollary of a body of physical theory. It will be derivable only within the 
language of this body of theory with the further proviso that some ceteris paribus 
clauses must hold. For these reasons I have labelled the “whenever” with a “*”, in 
order to remark that it is to be intended as a quantification over space and time and 
hence, following Quine’s own criterion of ontological commitment, as referring to an 
ontology of space and time adopted in the framework of a particular group of theories. 
From now on I will use “whenever” without “*” only when it introduces an 
observation categorical a la Quine, that is a generality prior to any objective reference.
Having discarded sentence (1) we can now turn to Quine’s words "... and they can 
read a thermometer" for a suggestion to the effect that the observation categorical may 
be
(2) Whenever a thermometer reads 180°, litholite smells in such a such way
Sentence (2) looks at first sight a bit odd, because, as it stands, it seems to suggest 
(absurdly) that the position of the thermometer is irrelevant for the truth of the
140 PT, p. 9-10. My emphasis.
141 This is one of the cases, already discussed, in which observation sentences used by specialists resist 
reduction to the layman language. This is not, however, the problem I intend to discuss here.
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consequent. This objection is up to a certain extent unfair, for, by definition, 
observation categoricals142 refer to pairs of observable events that are present, as Quine 
says, one the same scene and the same time. Sentence (1) does not say that if a 
thermometer put in an oven in York reads 180°, then a specimen of litholite in London 
(or, even worse, any sample of litholite in the universe) will start smelling. A valid 
objection would rather concern the need to specify precisely the distance between the 
thermometer and the sample under study. This objection introduces the real criticism 
of taking (2) to be part of the empirical content of a theory, that is: even granted that 
the first clause of (2) is built upon on observation sentence, no theory can by itself 
imply such an observation categorical. The observable fact that a mercury column is 
level with a sign labelled by a number has by itself nothing to do with anything 
physical theory can talk about; it has (again by itself) nothing do to with whatever we 
mean by "the value of the temperature". In order to connect with the theory the 
observable event that the experimenter can witness, that is, in order to interpret the 
observation sentences uttered by the experimenter as a test of a the theory, we need 
first to check that the thermometer is reliable. The reliability of an instrument amounts 
in turn to its correct functioning and its correct use according to our present-state 
physical knowledge. In order to accept the reading as correct, we must first find out (or 
assume), that each of its components has been calibrated, whether the liquid used is 
pure mercury and many other things (it seems that we can hear Duhem saying this). 
For instance we will have to check whether there is a strong magnetic field at the 
place-time where the experiment will be performed (it is well known that a mercury 
thermometer is not reliable in the presence of magnetic fields). In order to do this we 
need both our background knowledge and a host of observation reports. It is only the 
conjunction of this further auxiliary hypotheses and, crucially, of further observation 
reports that we can connect theory with observation. Once this preliminary work has 
been done, the experimenter will subscribe to
(3) When the (or this) thermometer reads 180°, litholite smells in such and such way
142 To be more precise free observation categoricals, as opposed to focal ones (see, PT, pp. 10-11 and 
FSS, p. 27).
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The problem now is that (3) is not an observation categorical, for it is not a general 
statement about the conjunction of observable events. Sentence (3) is an occasion 
sentence that an experimenter accepts once he has persuaded himself that some 
conditions are verified at the moment and at the time in which the experiment is 
performed. I have replaced “whenever” by “when” to stress that the confidence of the 
experimenter is limited to a short period of time. He will subscribe to (3) immediately 
after having carried out the necessary checks, and probably just before performing the 
experiment. If the experiment needs to be repeated, the decision on whether (3) is still 
to be relied upon will be left to the experimenter.
The foregoing analysis shows also that (3) cannot be said to be part o f the empirical 
content o f the theory even i f  the latter is defined in a way that is different from Quine's, 
for it would be senseless to regard as empirical content of an abstract theory something 
that can derived from it only by means of auxiliary observations and assumptions and 
that refers to particular objects.
A further attempt to save the generality of the implied sentence is to resort to
(4) Whenever* a reliable thermometer reads 180°, then litholite smells in such and 
such way
or else we could stipulate that the word "thermometer" means "reliable thermometer", 
but then the observationality of the first clause is lost (as the “*” indicates). Note, 
further, that the reliability of the thermometer is not sufficient to guarantee that (4) can 
be implied by the theory. It is conceivable that the temperature is in fact 180° and that 
still there is no gaseous emission due to the presence of disturbing factors. In case 
these factors are present, it is also possible, in principle, that the emission does take 
place and that the temperature is the predicted one, but the cause of the emission is a 
different one.
The necessary switch from (2) to (3), that is from the indeterminate to the 
determinate article corresponds to the need for some empirical investigation in loco, 
with the purpose of establishing that for that thermometer, in that place and at that 
time, the conditions are such that the conjunction of their description with the theory 
will imply a conditional involving observable events. Consequently this conditional
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will be labelled with indications of space and time. We will be able to say, staying with 
Quine's example, that, given that such and such conditions hold here and now, the 
simultaneous reading of the thermometer and smelly emission will amount to a 
confirmation of the theory.
I suppose that the example itself is a bit misleading. We are so used to reading 
thermometers in every day life, that we take those objects as interfaces between theory 
and observation: we seem to read something that so, to speak, is a temperature. It is 
possible to modify the example in such a way that this illusion vanishes. Imagine that 
our mineralogists feel such a fierce antipathy toward experimental physics, that they 
have asked a technician to build thermometers without any display. All they need for 
their experiments is a thermometer (based on whatever physical principle) closed in a 
box on top of which a bulb has been situated. The bulb lights when the thermometer 
reaches 180°. Then the sentences potentially belonging to the empirical content of the 
theory would be
(5) whenever a bulb lights, litholite smells in such and such way.
(6) when the (or this) bulb lights, litholite smells in such and such way.
I don't think anybody would consider (5) or (6) as part of the empirical content of a 
theory. It must be emphasised that there is no difference in principle between (5) and
(2) on one hand, and (6) and (3) on the other. What is actually seen by the 
experimenter as the result is the least important thing in the all procedure, for it is, at 
least to some extent, conventional. We can choose any observable event whatsoever to 
stand for any value of a physical magnitude; insofar we are sure that the correct causal 
chain between the observable event and the phenomenon under investigation is 
actually taking place. Displays, pointers or other similar devices are simply symbolic 
interfaces. There is though an important difference between the latter and ordinary 
symbols: we are free to use any object as symbol of any other object, but, when we 
interpret an observable event (what Duhem would call a brute fact) as expressing the
80
result of an experiment, we are judging that our theoretical interpretation is correct, 
and of course, nothing assures that we are not going astray.143
What is then, in the light of these considerations, the role of observation sentences 
in the testing of theories? Let us summarise the essential features of an experiment in 
physics. We start with a theory, for instance with Maxwell’s theory of 
electromagnetism. From the theory we derive a sentence expressing that whenever X 
occurs, also Y occurs. For instance we derive
(7) If in a region of space there is an electrical current of intensity I along a line (X), 
there will be a magnetic field of intensity B with cylindrical symmetry centred on the 
line (Y)
The sentence (7) is general and cannot be applied to a particular place-time, without 
the specification of ceteris paribus clauses.144 Once we have taken into account these 
first, abstract and general ceteris paribus clauses we can turn to a sentence like
(8) If in this region now, there is an X, then there is an Y, ceteris paribus
Now most of the work is still to be done. We must realise X in a concrete system and 
verify that we have done it properly with the aid of measurement devices. At this stage 
the observation sentences come into play: we must describe the apparatus (in this case 
an electrical circuit, a generator and so on) and our instruments (a galvanometer and a 
magnetometer). As I have already said the reliability of these instruments requires the 
trust in some physical theory, in some observation and in other ceteris paribus clauses. 
The experimental setting will typically involve symbolic interfaces, hence we will 
make sure, that under the given circumstances the following sentences are true "if the 
pointer of the galvanometer is in position A (for short, if A), then at this space-time (in
143 The fact that the second clause of the sentences (l)-(6) does not refer to a reading should not lead us 
into thinking that the same considerations would not apply to it. The fact that we smell a certain odour 
will count as a valid piece of information about the theory only under certain conditions. Anyway, most 
of experiments in physics generally involve only collections of numerical data as results, which means 
that the observable fact corresponding to them are pattern of liquid crystals, positions of pointers' and so 
on.
144 Clearly if in a certain region of space there are other sources of magnetic fields, the resulting field 
may have a different shape, or may be simply absent.
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our laboratory) there is an X" (a similar statement must be derived for the 
magnetometer, involving Y and an observation sentence B). When this procedure has 
been accomplished we can say that Maxwell's theory, in conjunction with ceteris 
paribus clauses and with many observations and auxiliary assumption predicts: "here 
and now, when A, B." Finally we perform the experiment and we verify whether 
indeed we would utter both sentences A and B. It follows from this analysis that the 
observation sentences A and B cannot be regarded as holophrastic expressions. They 
are relevant for the test of the theory only because we recognise that the terms 
occurring in them refer to objects that are part of the causal chain we have brought into 
existence in the laboratory at the time in which the experiment takes place. They make 
implicit reference to space-time co-ordinates and they have a term by term structure 
that renders them completely theory-laden in Quine's terms.
Take for instance A. If A is to have anything at all to do with Maxwell theory, its 
utterance must implicitly include reference to our notion of what a galvanometer is and 
so on. In practice, A is valuable for scientific reports only if intended as an 
abbreviation for a sentence like "at such and such place time, at which many ceteris 
paribus conditions hold, where this and that object are present, there is a galvanometer, 
which is an instrument of such and such characteristics, and which in this case is 
casually connected in this way to... and the pointer of the galvanometer is in position 
A". Therefore:
We also need the complete apparatus o f predication and objective reference for  
uttering an observation sentence that counts for a scientific report.
From the theory we cannot derive any observation categorical to be tested against 
observation sentences. On the contrary an observation sentence can count toward the 
testing of a theory only insofar we have, by means of theory and observation, decided 
that the context in which the observation is carried out is the appropriate one.
Nothing that is theory-free, such as a holophrastic expression, can constitute the 
checkpoint o f physical theory. Theory dictates the conditions for an observation 
sentence to bear relevance to a theory.
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It is easy to see that there is no end to the possible controls that a scrupulous 
experimenter may require. If, for instance, one suspects that there is something wrong 
with the shape of the glass column of a thermometer, one can resort to a technique 
devised for the purpose of detecting small irregularities on a surface. The experimenter 
may then doubt the reliability of his technique and call for further tests. At some point 
he will simply judge that the experimental setting is correspondent to his theoretical 
interpretation of it. This judgement will always imply the reliance on theory, on 
observation and on testimony, for certainly it is necessary in practice to believe, at 
least tentatively, that some instruments implemented have been manufactured and 
calibrated according to their finality. It is this theoretical judgement that stops the 
infinite process of checking the verification of the appropriate conditions and that 
allows an observable result to become epistemically significant for the test of a theory.
We can now evaluate Quine's claims 2) 3) 4).
2) From what has been said so far in an experiment there is no disentanglement 
between theory and observation that is achievable even in principle. Furthermore no 
sentence referring to observable events can be used in a test of a theory without 
specification of space and time.
3) The testing of theory cannot be done by means of holophrastic sentences, because a 
theory never implies observation categoricals. This does justice to the fact that a 
physical theory is never abandoned in the same way a common-sense belief sometimes 
is. My observing some A, not followed by B does not count as a disproof of any theory 
unless I specify when and where the observation was done and what conditions and 
hypotheses made me believe that the theory in question would have implied the 
occurrence of B given A in that moment. Indeed in official reports of experiments what 
Quine calls observation sentences are usually omitted, for the description of the 
context (including the specification of space and time) of the experiment and the 
interpretation of the data are much more important for the significance of the result 
(which will usually consist of a set of values). What an experimental physicist wants to 
make sure, when he publishes a report, is not so much that his colleagues will believe
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in what he has seen, but that they will understand how the experiment can, up to 
certain extent, be repeated. Indeed:
Physics is a collective enterprise, and a theory is buried by a literature, not by 
scattered episodes o f impingement on receptors by whatever it is that activates them.
On the contrary, as we have seen, the role of sensory stimulation, although 
indispensable for the scientific enterprise, is, in the practice of experimentation, 
subordinate to the role of theory. Furthermore, observation sentences used by scientists 
during an experiment must be seen as having internal structure, hence, according to 
Quine’s terminology, they must be considered theory-laden.
4) Quine's definitions of empirical content and empirical equivalence are unacceptable, 
for no physical theory implies observation categoricals.
4.2.1.1 Observation sentences and prediction
In this and in the following subsection I will deal with two objections that might be 
raised to defend Quine’s account of the relation between theory and observation from 
my criticism. The first concerns the role of observation in the everyday circumstances 
in which we rely on the predictions of physical theory.
It might be argued that in these situations we do utter observation sentences as 
unstructured wholes to describe events that are predicted by scientists. When people 
gather in a place to observe a solar eclipse, they are usually entirely unaware of the 
long labour that has been necessary for predicting that phenomenon. They look up to 
the sky and think: “there is an eclipse!” Some of the occasional observers may be 
children, or people ignorant of any physical theory. Some know that the dark circle 
obscuring the sun is the moon;145 others, short of any scientific knowledge, may 
wonder just like children what is happening to the sun itself. There are fragments of 
rival systems of the world surrounding the same observation sentence; but the
84
disagreement remains unnoticed. Everyone is ready to affirm “there is an eclipse” for 
having being conditioned to assent to that expression under relevant receptive 
episodes; and this is the only thing that matters for that occasion. What is of crucial 
importance, however, is that, in cases like the one just described, well confirmed 
theories are used simply as tools to make predictions at the level of common-sense 
facts. Observation has here no epistemic role. It would suddenly acquire scientific 
relevance in case some unforeseen event occurred; but then ordinary testimony would 
immediately give way to careful investigation.
The situation is reversed when we perform an experiment, for in an experiment 
observations are used as tools to test theories, and it is in the context of an experiment 
that the foregoing considerations apply. We must know how to master tools, we cannot 
use them unreflectively.
4.2.1.2 More on the relations between theories and observation categoricals
A second possible objection may concern the fact that it would seem questionable that 
no physical theory can imply an observation categorical. After all, the objection would 
run, a simple sentence such as
(9) “whenever lightning, thunder”
can be deduced by a consistent body of physical knowledge. We may be tempted to 
conclude that the criticism to Quine account’s of the relationship between theory and 
observation can work only when the predictions of a physical theory concern the 
results of measurement devices. If this were the conclusion, the criticism would still be 
very damaging for Quine, given that theoretical physics deals virtually only with 
predictions concerning the results of measurement devices. However, a more careful 
discussion will show that the considerations developed in the preceding sections can be 
applied also to the lightning and thunder case, and to similar ones.
145 They have made a step forward into theory by identifying the moon as normally seen with the dark 
circle visible during a solar eclipse. On identity and ostention, see FLPV, pp. 65-79.
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To start with it needs to be stressed that we cannot give a rigorously nomological 
account (that is in terms of laws and initial conditions) of phenomena as complex as a 
thunder. Physics is able only to provide explanations of them, through the aid of 
simplified models that have little predictive power.146 However for the purpose of this 
discussion I will assume that a rigorous nomological interpretation could be given, in 
principle, also for such irregular and multifarious phenomena. This assumption 
simplifies the discussion and constitutes, after all, a concession to Quine’s overall 
conception of science.
As we have seen Quine is trying to specify the empirical content of a theory. In 
order to achieve this he wants to reach a stage of analysis in which he can proclaim to 
have “the theory on one side” and “the observation categorical on the other”. Between 
these two levels he sees a relation of logical implication. I believe that this simple 
picture does not apply even to the trivial empirical generalisation we are discussing 
now, for, again, no body of physical theory however complicated will imply a sentence 
like (9) without being supplemented by an enormous amount of information 
concerning the atmosphere o f the Earth. Indeed no matter how many theories we avail 
ourselves of (electromagnetism, chemistry, mechanics, acoustics), sentence (9) will 
never be implied, for it is true only under particular conditions. We may be inclined to 
consider (9) as a primitive example of law of nature, but indeed, from the point of view 
of physical theory, it is not even the caricature of a law of nature.
Being used to verify (9) in everyday life we can believe that it states a generality, so 
that, following Quine, we can omit reference to space and time, but (9), seen as an 
empty generality cannot be derived from theory, that, referring only to theoretical
1 A 1ideal-types cannot say anything by itself about what happens in the atmosphere of 
the Earth. Indeed there is no reason to think that there cannot be a planet whose 
atmosphere gives rise to similar electrical phenomena, but is not very dense. In such an 
atmosphere a lightning may not be followed by a thunder. There would be of course a 
propagation of acoustic waves, but it would not be detectable by a human ear. 
Similarly we would be inclined to think that “whenever a stone is in the water, it 
sinks”148 can be seen as a consequence of Newton’s theory, but to convince us of the
146 For a model of the electric phenomena in the atmosphere, see Feynman, 1964, Vol. II, chapter 9.
147 See section 1.6.
14x An example of focal observation categorical.
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contrary it will suffice to think about what would happen if we tested this observation 
categorical in an orbiting laboratory, or if the stone were one of volcanic origin, whose 
specific weight is less than that of water. Generalisations of common-sense 
observations are normally false, if taken without further qualifications, besides a theory 
will imply them only when many such qualifications are added to it, and these 
qualifications must be expressed in the language of theory. Indeed these two facts are 
one and the same, for it is precisely because those generalisations are true only in some 
circumstances, that theory can imply them only under certain assumptions. In 
conclusion:
It is a model taking into account the specific conditions o f the Earth's atmosphere that 
must he added to theory in order to deduce a sentence similar to (9).
This model will be built with the aid of both observation and theory, and finally will be 
judged to be a faithful theoretical representation of what actually happens in the 
Earth’s atmosphere. Hence we find again that there is no purely theoretical side 
implying an observation conditional and hence (9) is not part of the empirical content 
of any theory.
The model I have just referred to is the analogue of the theoretical interpretation 
with which, as it is shown by Duhem (see section 1.2), the experimenter must mentally 
replace the actual experimental setting that he has before his eyes. Finally, even in 
conjunction with empirical information concerning the Earth, plus ceteris paribus 
clauses, plus an overall judgement of the applicability of the theories in the case at 
issue, (where the “case” must be defined also in terms of spatio-temporal co­
ordinates), our body of theories will not imply (9), intended as an unrestricted 
generality, but something like:
On the Earth, in the period of (geological!) time during which the 
density of the atmosphere exceeds a certain threshold value, a normal 
person placed within a certain distance from the area where a lightning 
involving an amount of energy that exceeds a given value is produced
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will, if there is no obstacle to the propagation of electromagnetic and 
acoustic waves, hear thunder after seeing the lightning.
An observation will be of some relevance to the refutation of the body of 
theoretical and empirical knowledge that does the implying, only if circumstantiated 
with all information that our knowledge of these phenomena renders pertinent.
The apparent difference between this case and that of the thermometer is due to the 
fact that whenever measurement instruments are involved, it is easier to realise that the 
assumptions concerning the correctness of the conditions setting the stage for a 
scientifically relevant observation must be checked continuously and with a high level 
of precision. This is why “the here and now” came into place. Normally, when an 
experimenter performs routine operations in his laboratory, he will simply forget about 
all the assumptions that he is making, for his experience tells him what he can be 
confident about at least tentatively. It is only from a logical point of view that the 
assumptions are reiterated at each step. This explains also why there is in practice an 
end to the potentially infinite regress of tests to which I referred before. The “here and 
now” in which the judgement to decreeing the relevance of the observations for the 
theory is expressed, can expand both in time and in space in proportion with the 
simplicity of the experiment, with the level of vagueness tolerated in the results and, 
most of all, in proportion with the confidence that the determining conditions are 
stable. If I am measuring the temperature of my body, I will not worry about which 
room of my apartment I am sitting in, or whether I am close to the magnetic field 
produced by a freezer.149
Sentence (9) seems detached by theory essentially for its lack of mathematical 
precision and its dependence on highly stable conditions. The laboratory in this case is 
the entire atmosphere of the Earth. The duration of the experiment is at least as long as 
mankind’s history. Furthermore when we talk about lightning followed by thunders we 
are not fussy about the correlation between the energy involved in the former and the 
intensity of the latter. In this laboratory, during this long time, we have become 
accustomed to witnessing the constant conjunction of these events. Hence we tend to
149 We have seen, commenting on Duhem’s analysis of the role of approximation in physics, that the 
more precise a measurement must be, the more conditions will become relevant for the correctness of 
the measurement (see end of section 1.2.1).
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believe that these conjunction is something like a law of nature, and that a theory o f 
the world should imply it. But from the lofty point of view of the theories of 
electromagnetism and mechanics, (whose language does not include terms like “Earth” 
or “atmosphere”), the atmosphere of the Earth is but one of the infinite possible 
instantiations of one of the ideal-types they can jointly define, just like the electric 
system of a house. We might consider (9) as a common-sense law, just like Duhem 
does (see section 1.1), but by doing so we would simply highlight the cleavage 
between scientific and common-sense knowledge.
There is no difference in principle between my confidence that when I press a 
switch a lamp will light, and my confidence that after seeing a lightning I will hear a 
thunder. The apparent differences are due to the fact that the conditions presupposed in 
one case are extremely more variable than those presupposed in the other. Will we 
require a theory of the world to imply observational generalisations concerning our 
chandeliers?
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5. AN ALTERNATIVE ACCOUNT OF THE RELATION BETWEEN 
THEORY AND OBSERVATION
Introduction
In this chapter I will sum up the results of the thesis and add further comments in order 
to sketch an account of the relation between theory and observation which is 
alternative to that of Quine. The impossibility to detach from theories their experiential 
implications is the starting point of these considerations.
In the first section the consequences of this impossibility for the concepts of 
empirical equivalence and underdetermination are illustrated. In the following section I 
analyse once more the link between theories and empirical evidence stressing the 
crucial role of practical activity in establishing it. In the third section I argue that 
Quine’s empiricist philosophy of science is still too close to Neopositivism and does 
not take into account the most important consequences of Duhem’s analysis. Finally, 
in the last section, the implications of the theory-ladenness of experimentation for the 
dilemma of empirically equivalent systems of the world are discussed.
5.1 Empirical equivalence (and underdetermination) without empirical content
Let us now consider, in the light of the preceding considerations, what sense can be 
made of the concepts of empirical equivalence and underdetermination. Following 
Quine, I will assume that two global theories are stated in the same language and that 
the proponents of both refer to observable events through the same observation 
sentences. As we have seen even in this case it would be impossible to detach from the 
two theories something like an empirical content, not even if we were able to 
encompass in a tight formulation an infinity of observation categoricals. The problem
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is by no means practical; the problem is that we lack a strategy for specifying the 
empirical content of any theory. From a theory we can derive only conditional 
sentences of the form
(9) Whenever* conditions C hold, then when A, B
(where A and B are two observation sentences, or more plausibly two long 
conjunctions of observation sentences). The reason why this sentence cannot be 
regarded as belonging to the empirical content of a theory is that its premise is not 
observational (that is, it cannot be verified observationally). As we have seen the 
explanation of this fact is twofold. On one hand the expression "whenever*" quantifies 
over space and time, and hence is committed to a particular ontology of space and 
time; on the other hand C consists of general of observation sentences such that "there 
is a small container full of water", but also of sentences containing theoretical terms 
such as "accumulator", or "inductance" (some of which refer to measurement devices) 
and describing ceteris paribus conditions in theoretical language.
Following this argument our search for the bottom level of the descent from theory 
to observation we will have to turn to
(10) If here and now conditions C hold, then (here and now) when A, B
If we distribute the "if1 over the many component sentences of the conjunction C, we 
will obtain a long conjunction of conditionals such as "if here and now there is a 
specimen of gold...", "if here and now there is a conductor with a resistance of 3 
Ohm". Each proponent of one of the two alternative theories of the world may indeed 
state a proposition like (10). Given our premises the two variants will be very different 
form each other. They will share only the observational part of the description. Both 
physicists will utter the conditional "if there is a specimen of gold", for under our 
assumption they share a common store of observation reports and, precisely for this 
reason they would both utter the second clause of (10). However the two conditions 
(let us call them C' and C") will radically differ one from the other, for they will share 
only some observation sentences. Theoretical terms would be present, for instance,
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whenever a certain value of a physical magnitude appears in the description of the 
conditions.
To illustrate this situation, suppose that a person interested in physics and with a 
good deal of practical skills has built a complicated machine with a bulb at the top and 
a switch on a side. The machine need not be useful at all, it can be seen as a big toy or 
as a kind of technological puzzle. This apparatus, however complicated, serves to a 
simple purpose: when you switch it on, the bulb lights. The ingenious craftsman 
invites the two physicists belonging to the two rival schools and challenges them to 
explain the functioning of the machine in terms of their own theories (note that we 
need not suppose that the craftsman defends a third theory of the world, he may well 
be accustomed to accept one of the two). They can open the apparatus, take away each 
component and perform any kind of test they may believe useful, but at the end of the 
analysis they must be able to deduce from their theoretical description of it that the 
bulb lights, when the switch has been pressed.
After long and careful investigation the two physicists have both drawn on a 
blackboard their interpretation of the experimental setting. In short they have both 
written a sentence of the form of (10). Actually, as they have before their eyes a given 
experimental setting, the two sentences will be
(11) Here and now conditions C' hold, hence when A, B
(12) Here and now conditions C" hold, hence when A, B
(where A and B mean respectively “the switch is in position on” and “the bulb lights”).
I believe we have now got as far as it is possible in the direction of defining a theory- 
free relation of empirical equivalence.150 The ingenious craftsman is able to say (by 
believing that none of the physicists has made a mistake), that the two systems of the 
world are empirically equivalent at this place-time and as far as the phenomenon 
investigated (the machine) is concerned. To be sure the real appreciation of the 
empirical equivalence of two theories, even in such a weak sense, would require the
150 For what has been said in section 4.2.1, sentences A and B, being uttered in the context on an 
experiment, must be interpreted by the two physicists according to the different internal structure that 
their respective language-theories prescribe.
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intellectual ability to master both theories of the world and the practical ability to 
perform all tests needed in order to describe the experimental setting according to 
those theories. After all, one of the two physicists could have made many mistakes, 
from the point of view of his own theory, that led fortuitously the a correct prediction.
The conclusion seems disappointing, for all we have is so to speak an indexical 
definition o f empirical equivalence; but this was certainly to be expected from the 
moment in which we realised, together with Quine, that there is no way to compare 
two different global theories of the world in terms of a theory-free notion of space­
time, and that we can't first fix a certain theory of space time and then go on comparing 
the two theories on that ground. Quine's solution was to resort to observation 
categoricals, which are time-free and space-free generalities. But we have seen that 
those categoricals are never implied by physical theories.151 Therefore we must be 
content with comparing the predictions made by the two rival schools case by case.
Strictly speaking there is no notion o f empirical equivalence, but a local one, local in 
the sense that it refers to a particular phenomenon defined ostensively, and to the 
particular place-time at which the phenomenon takes place.
I obviously sense some uneasiness here, for it seems that with a normal inductive step 
we could jump from (11) and (12) to a more general statement of empirical 
equivalence, because we would expect that "whenever" we used the big toy again, or 
"whenever" we were to build a similar one, the two theories would always make the 
same prediction. But this impression is motivated by the fact that we normally accept a 
basic theory of the world as more or less unquestionable, along with a well-established 
ontology of space-time. As we have seen, there is no theory-free way to express a 
generalisation of the experimental result just described that could be shared by both 
physicists.
In practice physicists will talk about empirical equivalence in a more 
straightforward way. They will compare different theories that are related to a common 
background of physical knowledge, but differ in the interpretation of the results of
151 Independently of the problem of having to specify a system of co-ordinates, it can be shown with 
arguments similar to the ones just illustrated, that a physical theory cannot imply even observation 
conditionals.
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some experiments, i.e. they differ in the interpretation of results that are themselves 
highly theoretical. One extreme case of this situation is provided by the already 
discussed example of van Fraassen, in which two theories branch away from each 
other only at the most theoretical level. However, as I have already pointed out, in 
cases like this we don’t speak of a purely empirical content that two theories share.
In conclusion, the concept of empirical equivalence can be construed in a narrow or 
in a broad way. If we require that it be applicable also to theories that are as different 
as they can be (given that they are related to the same observation sentences), then the 
notion of empirical equivalence must be indexical. If we are content with comparing 
theories that have all grown apart on top of some shared background knowledge, then 
the required notion of “empirical” equivalence can be a more liberal one, referring to a 
body of theory-laden facts, which is provisionally considered unquestionable (such is 
also the situation described in the examples of section 1.5.1). In both cases we talk 
about empirical equivalence, without reference to a purely empirical content.
The move from empirical equivalence to underdetermination is now more 
complicated. If we consider the hypothetical case of radically different rival systems o f  
the world,152, then we will have to talk only of an indexical notion of 
underdetermination, corresponding to indexical empirical equivalence. If instead we 
deal with the more pragmatic notion of empirical equivalence between two partial 
theories, then, the concept of local underdetermination will be at hand.153
5.2 The pragmatic dimension of the relationship between theory and observation
In the article Three Indeterminacies Quine seems to have in mind some of the 
objections just discussed to his account of the testing of theories:
Scientists are apt to feel that my account of test and refutation is still 
vastly over-simplified, despite its commendable holism. In practice a 
failed prediction is often excused, and a hypothesis saved, by finding
152 But see section 5.4 for some comments on the possibility of a system of the world.
153 In the case of partial theories, the step from empirical equivalence to underdetermination has been 
questioned by Laudan and Leplin (1991).
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or assuming some interference. Such an excuse, however, can be 
analyzed in my terms as a discovery of a logical error in the deduction 
of the observation categorical that was tested. Some tacit qualification 
of ceteris paribus needed to be sorted out. Some of its tacit clauses 
would have been needed among the experimental conditions -  hence 
in the antecedent o f the observation categorical -  for a rigorous 
clinching of the implication.154
Quine then goes on to say that in practice it is never possible to state all hypotheses 
that are needed to imply the observation categorical of an experiment. However his 
analysis, as he underlines, is intended to grasp the logical “essence” of empirical tests, 
to understand “how, in principle, empirical science might proceed if, heaven forbid, all 
were explicitly set down.”155 My intent has been precisely that of showing that Quine’s 
account is flawed in principle and fails to grasp the logical structure of scientific 
testing, not its multifarious and unmanageable details. What is striking is that while 
dealing with the problem of ceteris paribus clauses Quine realises that some of them 
will have to be about the experimental conditions, hence, as he says, in the antecedent 
of the observation categorical. But how then can this antecedent consist of a purely 
observable situation? These ceteris paribus clauses will be stated in theoretical 
language and will resist any translation into observation sentences for the reasons 
already discussed. Moreover, it is not only about these “other things being equal” 
clauses that one should worry about. The reliability of the instruments involved is 
again a theoretical concept that cannot be unpacked in observation language.
Indeed from my analysis as well as from the last long quotation it results that there 
are two logically different kinds of beliefs that a physicist must have in mind during 
the test of a theory. There are those belonging to the body of abstract theories that is 
under test; and there are those that concern narrowly the particular experimental setting 
he has before him. The conjunction of these two sets will then clearly not imply an 
unrestricted empirical generality, but only a contextual conjunction of particular 
observable events in the laboratory where the experiment is being performed. The 
abstract and general hypotheses (among which are the axioms of the theory and some
154 TI, p. 12. Emphasis added.
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ceteris paribus clauses) are needed in order to get down to the level of an ideal-type. 
At that level, and only at that level, we can have an unrestricted generality, stated in 
theoretical language. The second set of assumptions, the local and particular ones, is 
required so to speak to move in the opposite direction, from the concrete to the 
abstract. They are needed to subsume the observable situation under the ideal-type. No 
experimenter can proceed without them, for it is not the case that “theory tells him that 
if the hypothesis under consideration [the abstract and general one to be tested] is true, 
then, whenever a certain observable situation is set up, a certain effect should be 
observed.”156 The set up is observable, but no theory will imply a statement having as 
antecedent its description in observation sentences, even if this were possible in 
principle.
The two sets of hypotheses build up their own part of a bridge from the opposite 
banks of a river, and the bridge is not so much between theory and observation 
(although some preliminary observations will be needed on one side to describe the 
experimental setting), but between the universal and the particular, between the ideal- 
type and the realisation of the ideal-type. The final act of observation, the result, 
stands, so to speak, on top of the bridge; it consists of the observational description of 
a particular event or group of events that is logically linked to the realm of abstraction 
by the bridge, but only insofar other hypotheses support the bridge on the other side. If 
the bridge is wobbling, then the cognitive import of the observation, that is of the 
sensory stimulation, becomes suspect. Without bridge there is no experiment, but only 
bird watching.
The Duhemian character of these considerations should be evident. What I called, 
while discussing Duhem, the “scientific judgement” needed in order to subsume a 
concrete situation under an ideal-type amounts precisely to the move from the 
particular to the abstract that allows the logical connection of theories not with 
unrestricted empirical regularities (for they are never connected to them), but with 
local conjunctions of observable events. This move is a “very complex intellectual 
elaboration which substitutes for the recital of concrete facts an abstract and symbolic 
judgement.” 137
155 Ibid.
156 Ibid., p. 8. Emphasis added.
157 ASPT, p. 153.
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Duhem talks about “intellectual elaboration” while describing how the physicist 
states the result of his experiment in abstract and symbolic language. Such an 
elaboration though is needed also at the beginning of the experiment, when the setting 
is judged to be correct. I believe that here Duhem’s analysis is somehow incomplete, 
for it does not underline enough the distinctive role of the experimenters’ practical 
activity. In order to judge that some observable conditions can be described in a certain 
way in the language of theory, a physicist cannot simply observe and recall his 
theoretical knowledge, he must perform some operations, namely, tests and 
measurements. An experiment does not simply amount to the interplay of theory and 
observation, it is based on the latter along with practical operations. If we intend to 
know whether what we have before us is a reliable galvanometer, or whether a 
conductor has really a certain resistance, we will have to act in some way on those 
objects. The scientific judgement is therefore based on a form o f subsumption that has 
also a pragmatic dimension.
We can see the contrast with the case in which we want to understand if a given 
vector space is an Hilbert space, or if a function is differentiable. In those cases we 
simply find out whether some abstract objects have or fail to have the properties 
relevant for membership in a class of abstract objects. There is usually a routine for 
doing this and a computer is able to carry out the task. Also the classification of 
ordinary objects can be in some cases reproduced approximately by pattern- 
recognising systems. The activity of the experimenter is a different matter. The 
judgement stating that the experimental setting is correct relies on a complex activity, 
which besides being theory-dependent is also practice-dependent.
The real starting point in an experiment is, of course, the very theory that one 
intends to test. So much would be granted even by Quine. The next step consists of the 
realisation of an experiment. In general, for this purpose, a concrete device has to be 
constructed. Each of its components needs to be carefully manufactured according to 
our aim, relying on tools and measurement instruments. Then the device needs to be 
checked and finally prepared (calibrated) for the particular experiment we have in 
mind: in an experiment the hand is no less necessary than the eye. Just before actually 
carrying on with the test, the experimenter tentatively commits himself to a scientific 
judgement, which presupposes all the background knowledge and all the activities
97
involved in the preliminary stage (therefore it will rely also on memory and testimony, 
see section 4.2). Note that any complicated experiment requires a careful discussion of 
the various approximations tolerated in the preparation as well as in the execution. 
Moreover it requires stopping at some point the infinite regress of controls to which I 
have already referred. There is no given routine that the experimenter can follow to 
accomplish his aim. The first thing a student is told in a laboratory is that it is 
experience, intuition and autonomous thinking that matter, not the commandments 
found in scholarly primers to experimental physics.
This scientific-pragmatic judgement creates the logical connection between the 
theory and the phenomena that will be observed. In what sense is this connection 
logical? If we consider a very simple experiment, in which we just expect to see a 
pointer in a certain position after an apparatus has been switched on, then we can say 
that the conjunction of some theories (among which the one to be tested) with the 
judgement about the experimental setting literally implies the expected result. This 
derivation, however, differs in a distinctive trait from those of, say, mathematics and 
pure geometry. The difference does not lie so much in the fact that a derivation in 
mathematics and in geometry leads unavoidably to true conclusions if no logical error 
is made, while the predictions of physics can turn out be wrong for reasons that have 
nothing to do with logic. In my view the most striking difference lies in the fact that 
among the premises of the experimenter’s derivation there is one, the final judgement 
about the experimental setting, which has a kind of indexical nature. A theory is 
logically connected to experience only in virtue of a judgement, which is uttered by a 
person at a place-time about a particular context. Once stated, the judgement allows 
the implying, the logical connection; but this logical connection exists solely in virtue 
of human activity, and is established only within its spatial and temporal bounds.
Empiricism is often seen as a philosophy that enhances the role of subjectivity. The 
phenomenalists’ attempt to translate science into a sense datum language thus 
rendering theoretical talk in principle redundant, can be seen as a move toward the 
identification of knowledge with what is given to the subject. Quine, as we have seen, 
is still to a certain extent close to that point of view. He is still inclined to think, in 
some rather unclear sense, that if we knew everything about the observable world, we 
would be dispensed with theory. However Quine believes that there is a purely logical
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link between theory and observation, a time-less link which connects theory to 
generalisations expressed in observational language, which in turn correspond to 
constant conjunctions of specific patterns of stimulation. In this way the relationship 
between theory and evidence is abstracted from the conscious activity of the subject. 
Observation is given priority in knowledge, but it is encoded in observation 
conditionals that, so to speak, stand on their own. Indeed Quine sees also their 
relationship with abstract theories as standing on its own, in the realm of ideas 
(forgetting for a moment Quine’s opposition to any kind of Platonism). This view is 
coherent with the conception according to which science is fundamentally a set of 
sentences, or a part of our language. Some sentences, the theoretical, stand in logical 
relation of implication with some others, the observation conditionals. Here we find 
the roots of Quine’s belief that the empirical content of a theory can be detached from 
the theory itself.
I believe, on the contrary that science can be better portrayed as an activity based 
on theorising, manipulation and observation. The evidential link between theory and 
observation can only exist pending a scientific-pragmatic judgement that mediates 
locally between the realm of abstractions and the world of tangible objects. In physics 
the divine Demiurge who shapes matter in accordance with the ideal forms is the very 
physicist who builds the experimental setting and verifies that it is has the required 
characteristics.
In conclusion, it is impossible to abstract science and, in particular, the evidential 
link between science and observation from the active role played by the human 
subject, that, besides being a recipient of stimulations, is also a conscious agent who 
chooses and deliberates according to pre-established aims and beliefs.
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5.3 The theory-laden ness of experimentation versus Quine’s empiricism
The contrast between Carnap and Quine is, after all, not very sharp. According to 
Carnap it makes sense to speak about the experiential consequences of the truth of a 
single statement; according to Quine instead only a conjunction of statements can have 
empirical meaning. Such a conjunction must have a critical semantic mass in order to 
imply anything observable. As a conjunction of statements is nothing but a statement, 
Quine’s divergence from Carnap amounts simply to the restriction of the number of 
statements that are empirically meaningful. Quine’s holistic turn boils down to this 
restriction; the rejection of the analytic-synthetic distinction being, as we have seen, a 
consequence of it. Verificationism is there and so is the belief that the empirical 
content of theories can be individuated and separated from the theories.
We have seen that Quine’s rejection of the intuitive notion of meaning leads to a 
problem for the coexistence of empiricism and holism. In what sense can language be 
welded to experience if there is no sentence that has by itself empirical meaning? The 
notions of observation sentence and of stimulus meaning are designed to solve this 
problem. The solution comes through the acceptance of a naturalistic theory of 
knowledge, in the framework of which empiricism becomes a scientific thesis and 
semantics itself becomes empirical. Some sequences of sounds are related through 
conditioning to given receptive situations: here we have the constraints that experience 
imposes on language. Quine is then a holist, for he claims that only conjunctions of 
hypotheses can be tested, and an empiricist, for he believes that the cognitive 
significance of such conjunctions is limited to their experiential implications.
I have not questioned whether Quine’s empiricism might be successful as an 
account of common-sense knowledge. I have instead argued that it cannot be applied 
to the case of physics. In point of logic, holism alone does not suffice to support my 
criticism. If holism is taken narrowly as the thesis that only a conjunction of 
hypotheses can be empirically tested, then we cannot derive from it that it is 
impossible to separate from a theory its (purely) empirical content. This impossibility I 
take to be rather a consequence of a thesis that is logically stronger than holism, for it 
implies it, namely that physical experiments are necessarily based on the interpretation 
in theoretical terms of what is directly observed. I have above described this thesis as
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the motivation for Duhem’s holism or as the thesis of the theory-ladenness of 
experimentation, for it provides an argument to the effect that tests in physics have 
necessarily a holistic character (see section 1.4).
We can now reconsider the question posed in sections 1.6 and 1.6.1: what does it 
mean to say that the aim of theory is to save the phenomena? In those two sections I 
have argued that the theory-ladenness of experiments forces us to give a new meaning 
to this time-honoured motto, for theory saves phenomena that are shaped by it. I 
stressed that background knowledge is what is needed in order to subsume a pattern of 
observable facts under an ideal-type, which in turn constitutes what theory deals with. 
In the last section I have remarked on the pragmatic component of this kind of 
subsumption. Quine has followed a different direction. Instead of accepting that the 
phenomena scientists investigate are theory-laden and practice-laden, he tries to define 
a theory-free empirical content of scientific theories consisting of empirical regularities 
that can be tested against observation sentences. After all, Quine could argue, if theory 
predicts unrestricted regularities at the level of the ideal-types, and if background 
knowledge (that is other theory) allows us to subsume observable situations under 
ideal-type, it should be possible in principle to formulate all the various observable 
regularities that correspond to the same theoretical regularity. The criticisms contained 
in chapter 4 are intended to show that this strategy is not available: theory cannot 
imply unrestricted generalities concerning the conjunction of observable situations.
Science is not a conceptual bridge linking sensory stimulation to sensory 
stimulation, for in a scientific experiment of some complexity theory is always on both 
side of sensory stimulation. I believe, therefore, that Quine’s account of the empirical 
basis of science is vitiated by the failure to appreciate the different status of 
experimentation with respect to common-sense observation. In this sense my position 
is fully Duhemian. We can say that experiments present a peculiar holistic character 
that has remained unnoticed by Quine, in spite of his acquaintance with Duhem’s 
writings.
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5.4 Incommensurable scientific traditions versus empirically equivalent systems of 
the world
Let us go back to the problem of empirically equivalent systems of the world. What I 
have being arguing for is that if we follow Duhem in thinking that some of the bundle 
of hypotheses needed for implying an observable consequence will bestow to it its 
physical meaning, then we realise that there is no theoretically neutral evidence for 
physical theories. Observable events count as evidence for or against a theory when 
they occur within a context that can be defined only in theoretical terms. Therefore 
there is no general purely empirical ground on which to compare two radically 
different systems of the world, even if they share a common store of observation 
sentences. Indeed it becomes problematic to formulate the very idea of a system of the 
world. For, in what sense can a physical theory be complete? The idea of a complete 
physics can perhaps make sense if we accept the existence of given range of 
phenomena, which are ready-made, waiting for us, just like the Quinean observation 
categoricals. Without this assumption, the concept of “system of the world” is in the 
need of clarification.
I believe Quine’s thought-experiment should be modified, by giving up reference to 
empirically equivalent systems of the world and by considering instead the logical 
possibility of two entirely independent, highly developed traditions o f research. We 
can still assume that the members of the two rival schools adopt the same set of
1 58observation sentences. As we have seen, the only conceivable comparison would be 
based on indexical empirical equivalence. However for most purposes even this 
minimal form of direct empirical comparison would not be possible. Most of the 
experiments in an advanced science yield results that resist reduction to a simple 
conjunction of observable events. This is due both to the already stressed fact (see 
section 1.6) that many physical theories developed in the Twentieth Century do not 
have any “ostensive” character, and to the complication often involved in the analysis 
of data. An experiment at the CERN, for instance, requires a sophisticated elaboration 
of a huge amount of data, which needs to be carried out case by case (not to mention
1581 refer to traditions or schools o f physics, without presupposing that they would be in agreement as to 
the rest of knowledge. Like Quine, I assume that their agreement may not go beyond observation 
sentences intended holophrastically.
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the complexity of the preparation of the experiment). Without such theoretical 
elaboration there is no result, but only noise. If we take in consideration also the 
directive role of theories in suggesting what experimental setting to realise, we might 
expect (although this would be by no means necessary from logical point of view) that 
the proponents of the two rival traditions would look for different things in different 
directions, would carry out radically different experiments, interpreting observable 
results each according to their own theories, and would perform in their laboratories 
operations that have no meaning for the scientists trained in the other tradition. In 
short, it would be even likely (but, at any rate, certainly possible) that the two 
traditions could turn out to be essentially incommensurable.
The mere logical possibility of this eventuality is enough to suggest, in my view, 
that the discussion over ecumenism and sectarianism in epistemology should be recast 
in a framework in which underdetermination has given way to incommensurability. 
Furthermore the latter and not so much the former, should be seen, in general, as 
deeply related to the Duhemian findings concerning the holistic character of physics.
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